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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays studying firm dynamics and expectation
formation. The first essay quantifies a tradeoff associated with lean inventory man-
agement. The second essay makes sense of simultaneous over- and underreaction in
a noisy information setting with time-varying volatility. The third essay offers a new
testable implication as a way to narrow the set of models of belief formation that are
consistent with survey data.
The first essay investigates just-in-time production (JIT). I first construct a new
measure of JIT at the firm level through a text search. Relative to non-adopters,
I document that adopters experience higher sales and smoother outcomes, however,
they are also more cyclical and sensitive to weather events. Motivated by these
facts, I build and structurally estimate a dynamic general equilibrium model of JIT
production. Relative to a counterfactual reflecting the adoption patterns of the 1980s,
firms in the estimated economy benefit from a 1% increase in firm value in normal
times. Amid a COVID-like disaster, however, the estimated economy experiences a
1.6 percentage point sharper contraction.
The second essay examines the role that volatility can play in generating seemingly
non-rational behavior. First, I document that the same professional forecaster over-
and underreacts to distinct macroeconomic variables. I then show that such behavior
v
can arise in a noisy information environment with unobserved volatility and costly
model adoption. In such a model, forecasters overreact to variables for which they
have less precise information and underreact to variables for which they have more
precise information. I provide empirical evidence in favor of this explanation and
calibrate a version of this model to show that it can replicate meaningful shares of
simultaneous over- and underreaction.
The third essay similarly relates to survey expectations. By way of example, I
show that rational and non-rational models alike are able to deliver the same linear
relationship between forecast errors and revisions. I specifically focus on a rational
model of strategic interaction as well as non-rational models of overconfidence and
diagnostic expectations. I propose examining the serial correlation of revisions instead
as it is able to distinguish between these three models.
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Spread Too Thin: The Impact of Lean
Inventories
1.1 Introduction
Up to 70% of manufacturers have reportedly adopted just-in-time (JIT) production,
a management philosophy that aims to minimize the time between orders.1 Firms
adopt JIT in an effort to cut costs associated with managing large material purchases
and storing idle stocks. Instead, these firms commit to placing smaller more frequent
orders from suppliers.2 Consequently, lean inventory management has contributed to
the 11% reduction in aggregate inventory holdings as a share of sales from 1992-2019.3
Do improvements in inventory management matter for macroeconomic fluctua-
tions? Theoretically, in general equilibrium, inventories have been found to be im-
material for aggregate dynamics (Iacoviello, Schiantarelli, & Schuh, 2011; Khan &
Thomas, 2007). Empirically, some find that inventory management improvements
decreased aggregate volatility (Davis & Kahn, 2008) while others (Stock & Watson,
2002) find that it was broadly inconsequential.
This paper offers a new perspective on the role of lean inventories in driving aggre-
gate fluctuations, finding that it can create macro fragility in the face of unexpected
1In 2015, the Compensation Data Manufacturing & Distribution Survey found that 71% of sur-
veyed firms employ lean manufacturing. Similarly, in 2007, the Industry Week/MPI Census of
Manufacturers found that 70% of respondents had implemented lean manufacturing.
2Ohno (1988) provides a detailed history of JIT which first started with Toyota’s Kanban system.
3U.S. Census Bureau, Total Business: Inventories to Sales Ratio [ISRATIO], retrieved from
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ISRATIO.
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shocks such as COVID-19. I document evidence of this tradeoff from a novel dataset
of JIT firms and quantitatively assess the role that lean production plays at the micro
and macro levels in a structurally estimated heterogeneous firms model.
I first provide firm-level evidence linking the JIT adoption decision to higher firm
sales and lower firm volatility. This provides motivating evidence as well as a set
of moments that I use when structurally estimating the model. Within firms, JIT
adoption is associated with a 16% decrease in inventory-to-sales ratios and a 9%
increase in sales. In addition, JIT firms experience an 8-9% decline in employment
and sales growth volatility. These empirical results, though not causal, are consistent
with positive selection into adoption which subsequently yields firm-level efficiency
gains as in my model.
I then exploit variation external to the firm and document that JIT adopters are
exposed to the business cycle and other unexpected aggregate events. At the firm
level, sales growth among JIT firms comoves more closely with GDP growth than
non-JIT firms. JIT firms are estimated to be between 50-70% more cyclical than
non-JIT firms. In addition, JIT adopters experience a 4 percentage point sharper
drop in sales growth when their suppliers face unexpected weather disasters (Barrot
& Sauvagnat, 2016). My analysis points to heightened sensitivity among JIT firms
upon the realization of external shocks, indicating that an economy composed of more
JIT producers is less resilient to such disturbances.
In light of these empirical facts, I build and structurally estimate a dynamic
general equilibrium model of JIT production. The model features a rich distribution of
firms that differ in their idiosyncratic productivity, inventory holdings, and inventory
management strategy. Materials are needed for production and can be acquired
subject to a stochastic fixed order cost. JIT firms draw order costs from a distribution
that is first order stochastically dominated by those of non-JIT firms. Implementing
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JIT requires incurring a fixed initial adoption cost and a smaller continuation cost
thereafter. In a given period, firms must choose their JIT adoption status, whether
to order materials, and how much to produce.
I numerically solve and structurally estimate the model via the simulated method
of moments (SMM) based on data from 1980-2018. Relative to a counterfactual
economy with less JIT, re-estimated from data during the 1980s, the estimated model
yields a welfare gain of 0.6%.4 In addition, the estimated model delivers a 0.2%
increase in measured TFP in the steady state. Intuitively, JIT adoption leads to
an economy-wide reduction in fixed order costs which enables adopters to better
align their material input use with their realized productivity. As a result, measured
aggregate productivity rises as firms smooth out their inventory cycles, leading to a
9% reduction in firm-level sales volatility, consistent with the decline observed in the
micro data.
Whereas individual adopters benefit from JIT in normal times, the existence of
leaner firms renders the economy more vulnerable to unexpected shocks. I consider an
unanticipated productivity shock calibrated to match the drop in real US GDP during
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. This unforeseen supply chain disruption mimics
the nature of the COVID-19 shock, while relating more generally to my empirical
evidence on weather disasters.5
Relative to the counterfactual economy, the JIT economy experiences a higher
frequency of stock outs and a more gradual depletion of inventories. Since JIT firms
store fewer materials in their plants, an unexpected spike in the price of materials
makes them more susceptible to stocking out. At the same time, as the price of
material inputs rises, inventories are suddenly more highly prized, with an increase
4For comparison, this welfare figure lies in the estimated range of welfare costs of business cycles
and is similar to the welfare cost of managerial short-termism.
5This is also consistent with other work modeling COVID-19 as an unexpected shock (Arellano,
Bai, & Mihalache, 2020; Espino, Kozlowski, Martin, & Sanchez, 2020).
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in the shadow value of inventories within the firm. As a result, producers that do
not fully stock out cut back on material input use in an effort to draw inventories
down more slowly. The utilization of fewer material inputs in production in the JIT
economy due to stock outs and hoarding leads to a sharper drop in output relative
to the counterfactual model.
In short, my empirical and theoretical analysis reveals and quantifies a stark trade-
off between steady state gains and macro vulnerability. Firms benefit in normal times
from pursuing a lean inventory strategy, however upon the realization of an unantic-
ipated shock, an economy populated by more JIT firms experiences a deeper crisis
than one with fewer lean producers. In this sense, inventories can serve as a stabilizing
force.
Inventory investment has long been of interest to economists as a potential source
of macroeconomic volatility.6 Seminal contributions developed production smooth-
ing models (Eichenbaum, 1984; Ramey & Vine, 2004) and (S,s) models (Caplin,
1985; Scarf, 1960) of inventory investment. Khan and Thomas (2007) elegantly
models inventories in a general equilibrium environment with heterogeneous firms
and business cycle shocks. The authors find that inventories play little to no role
in amplifying or dampening business cycles.7 My model is similar with the addition
of idiosyncratic productivity, an endogenous JIT adoption decision, and a focus on
large unanticipated shocks. Moreover Bachmann and Ma (2016) highlights the role
that inventories play in a lumpy investment model and argues that inventories can
also speak to the macro implications of investment with non-convex adjustment costs
(Bachmann, Caballero, & Engel, 2013). I add to our understanding of inventories
with a quantitative exercise emphasizing an important tradeoff between micro and
6See for instance Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2002), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Mc-
Carthy and Zakrajsek (2007), Irvine and Schuh (2005), and McMahon and Wanengkirtyo (2015).
7Iacoviello et al. (2011) comes to a similar conclusion albeit through a different model. On the
other hand, Wen (2011) builds a stock-out avoidance model and finds that inventories are stabilizing.
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macro stability amid unexpected disasters.
In addition, this paper relates to a strand of the management literature that fo-
cuses on assessing the gains to JIT. Kinney and Wempe (2002) finds that JIT adopters
outperform non-adopters, primarily through profit margins. Nakamura, Sakakibara,
and Schroeder (1998) as well as Roumiantsev and Netessine (2008) find similar evi-
dence. Gao (2018) examines the role of JIT production in corporate cash hoarding.
My paper provides a bridge between evidence documented in the management liter-
ature and the rich literature on inventories in macroeconomics by highlighting how
JIT production matters for aggregate outcomes.
Furthermore, this paper relates to the literature on supply chain disruptions. On
the empirical front, I adopt a strategy similar to Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) to de-
termine whether JIT producers are disproportionately exposed to unexpected weather
disasters. Other empirical work has assessed how shocks propagate through a net-
work of firms. For instance, Carvalho, Nirei, Saito, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2016) does
this in the context of the 2011 Japanese earthquake. Similarly, Cachon, Randall, and
Schmidt (2007) assesses empirical evidence of the bullwhip effect along the supply
chain. From a theoretical perspective, my paper relates to models of heterogeneous
firms, sunk costs, and supply chains. Meier (2020) models supply chain disruptions
in the context of time to build. Moreover, I model the JIT adoption decision in a
manner similar to Alessandria and Choi (2007) who model path dependent export
decisions. My paper explicitly links supply chain disruptions to an important source
of investment at the macro level, inventory accumulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 documents evidence
that is consistent with the stabilizing effects of JIT at the firm level along with the
exposure to unexpected shocks that it engenders at the macro level. Sections 1.3
and 1.4 develop the general equilibrium model of lean production. I estimate the
6
model in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 quantifies the aforementioned micro-macro tradeoff
associated with JIT, and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Patterns Among JIT Firms
Before presenting the model of JIT production, I document empirical evidence that
JIT adopters are more efficient and yet are more exposed to external shocks. I use
this as motivating evidence for the model that I present in Section 1.3. This analysis
will also provide moments and external validation to the model once I structurally
estimate it.
I first gather firm-level information by making use of Compustat Fundamentals
Annual data for manufacturers (NAICS 31-33) from 1980-2018. I merge these data
with information on county-level weather events from the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA) with specific links from Barrot and Sauvagnat
(2016). In addition, I develop a new measure of JIT adoption among publicly traded
manufacturers by updating and extending previous work in the literature (Gao, 2018;
Kinney & Wempe, 2002). This is done through an exhaustive analysis of news re-
ports and SEC filings. Following the literature, I search these documents for key
words such as “JIT,” “just-in-time,” “lean manufacturing,” “pull system,” and “zero
inventory.” I then analyze each of these documents to confirm the year of adoption
and to ensure that the firm in question implements JIT rather than any suppliers po-
tentially mentioned in the announcements. In all, my dataset identifies the years in
which approximately 185 Compustat manufacturers adopted JIT.8 My final sample
consists of an unbalanced panel of 5,099 unique manufacturing firms spanning the
8While the information on JIT adoption assuredly precludes any false positives, the limited nature
of these documents across the thousands of manufacturers in Compustat leaves open the potential
for false negatives in my sample. I account for the possibility of measurement error when modeling
JIT by incorporating a parameter that in part governs the observed frequency of adoption. Section
1.5 discusses this in further detail.
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Fixed effects Firm, Industry × Year Firm, Industry × Year
Observations 37,154 37,154
Notes: The table reports panel regression results from Compustat Annual Fundamentals of manu-
facturing firms (NAICS 31-33) based on regression (1.1). The regressor of interest is the firm-year
specific adoption indicator. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The standard deviations
of the dependent variables are 0.68 and 2.15, respectively. *** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes
5% significance, and * denotes 10% significance.
aforementioned time period.9
Using these data, I document four facts about JIT adopters.10 First, JIT adoption
is associated with lower inventory holdings and higher sales.11 I estimate:
yijt = γadopterijt + δjt + δi + νijt, (1.1)
where yijt is an outcome variable for firm i belonging to 6-digit NAICS manufacturing
industry j in year t. I specify the outcomes to be log inventory-to-sales ratio and log
sales. The regressor of interest, adopterijt, is a time-varying indicator for whether
firm i is a JIT adopter in a given year.
Table 1.1 reports the regression results. Adopters experience a 16% decrease in
inventory-to-sales ratios and a 9% increase in sales. The results imply a change of
-23% and 4% of one standard deviation in the outcomes, respectively. The regression
results allude to the benefits of JIT in the model. Facing lower fixed order costs,
9Appendix A.1 provides summary statistics of the data.
10Appendix A.1 documents similar facts at the industry level, indicating that these patterns do
not wash out with aggregation.
11This is consistent with Fullerton and McWatters (2001) and Cua, McKone, and Schroeder (2001).
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Table 1.2: JIT Adoption and Variance of Outcomes
(1) (2)
Employment growth variance Sales growth variance
Adopter -0.079* -0.087**
(0.041) (0.032)
Fixed effects Firm, Industry × Year Firm, Industry × Year
Observations 16,055 16,055
Notes: The table reports panel regression results from Compustat Annual Fundamentals of manu-
facturing firms (NAICS 31-33) based on regression (1.1). The regressor of interest is the firm-year
adoption indicator. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes 1% significance, **
denotes 5% significance, and * denotes 10% significance.
adopters hold fewer inventories in favor of placing smaller more frequent orders. Upon
shrinking their inventory stocks, adopters also incur fewer carrying costs. These cost
reductions lead adopters to allocate more resources to production.
Second, JIT adopters experience less micro volatility. I re-estimate (1.1) where
yijt now denotes a rolling 5-year standard deviation of sales growth and employment
growth for firm i in industry j in year t. Table 1.2 reports the results. Adopters
see an 8% decline in employment growth volatility and a 9% decline in sales growth
volatility. This is consistent with the stabilizing role that JIT plays in the model.
As firms smooth out their inventory cycles due to the lower fixed order costs, they
moderate the variability of other outcomes as well.
I next document facts relating to firm-level exposure brought on by JIT, exploiting
aggregate variation and examining sensitivity to a set of specific events such as macro
fluctuations and weather disasters. The regression results accord with the model in
that adopters are less insured against unanticipated disruptions, and an economy with
more JIT firms is more exposed to aggregate shocks.
Third, JIT adopters tend to be more cyclical. I quantify this via regressions that
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Table 1.3: JIT Adoption and Cyclicality
Sales growth Sales growth
GDP growth 1.017***
(0.070)
Adopter × GDP growth 0.710*** 0.476*
(0.197) (0.271)
Controls Yes Yes
Fixed Effect Firm, Industry Firm, Industry × Year
Observations 32,881 28,665
Notes: The table reports regression results from Compustat Annual Fundamentals of manufacturing
firms (NAICS 31-33) based on regression (1.2). The independent variable of interest is the interaction
between the adopter indicator and GDP growth. Control variables include logs of sales per worker,
firm size, cash-to-assets, and cost of goods-to-sales, as well as the adoption indicator. Column (1)
reports results without year fixed effects. Column (2) includes year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. *** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance, and * denotes
10% signficance.
interact adoption with GDP growth:





+ δi + δj + εjt,
(1.2)
where X denotes a set of controls that include sales per worker, firm size, cash hold-
ings, and cost of goods sold-to-sales. The coefficient γ3 measures the extent to which
firms exhibit more cyclicality. Table 1.3 reports the regression results. Based on
column (1), a 1% increase in GDP growth is associated with a roughly 1% increase
in sales growth among non-adopters. Adopters experience an additional sales growth
increase of 0.7% above this baseline. After also controlling for industry trends, I find
that adopters are about 50-70% more cyclical than non-adopters.
Fourth, JIT adopters are more sensitive to local weather events. I examine this
10




Total upstream disasters -0.032*
(0.018)
Adopter × Total upstream disasters -0.044**
(0.019)
Fixed Effects Firm, Industry × Year
Observations 1,192
Notes: The table reports weather event regressions from a sample of Compustat manufacturing firms
(NAICS 31-33) based on regression (1.3). The independent variable of interest is the interaction
between the adoption indicator and total number of upstream disasters. Control variables include
number of upstream suppliers and sales per worker, cost of goods-to-sales, and inventory-to-sales for
both the downstream firm and its average upstream supplier. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. *** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance, and * denotes 10% significance.





+X′ijtβ+ δjt+ δi+ εijt.
(1.3)
The disasterijt variable denotes the log of total upstream disasters faced by firm
i residing in industry j in year t. I collect information on weather disasters from
NOAA and link these disasters to a firm’s upstream suppliers’ zip codes via the
aforementioned Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) links. The control variables specified
in X include the number of upstream suppliers as well as a set of controls (sales per
worker, cost of goods sold-to-sales, and inventory-to-sales) for the downstream firm
and for the average of its upstream suppliers.
Table 1.4 reports the estimation results. Consistent with Table 1.1, adopters tend
to be more profitable. Moreover, a 1% increase in the total number of disasters
hitting a firm’s suppliers tends to reduce downstream firm sales growth by around 3
percentage points, a roughly 16% standard deviation decrease. Adopters experience
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an additional 4 percentage point drop, making them more than twice as sensitive to
upstream disasters as non-adopters.
Taken together, the data suggest that JIT adopters benefit from higher profits and
smoother outcomes. At the same time, adoption is associated with heightened expo-
sure to aggregate fluctuations and unanticipated shocks as proxied by local weather
disasters. My model of heterogeneous firms with an endogenous JIT adoption deci-
sion can explain these patterns. The model also allows me to quantitatively assess
the impact of JIT amid an unanticipated macro disaster, something that cannot be
captured by firm level regressions.
1.3 A Model of Just-in-Time Production
Having illustrated the essence of the tradeoff in the data, I next build the full general
equilibrium model which will provide quantitative statements about the implications
of JIT. The model is similar in spirit to Khan and Thomas (2007) and Alessandria and
Choi (2007), embedded with JIT and ultimately incorporating large unanticipated
disasters rather than traditional business cycle shocks.
A representative household has preferences over consumption and leisure. The
household supplies its labor frictionlessly to the two sectors of the economy: the
intermediate goods sector and the final goods sector. A representative intermediate
goods firm produces materials by using labor and capital. In addition, a continuum
of heterogeneous final goods firms make use of labor and materials to produce using
a decreasing returns to scale technology. Final goods producers are heterogeneous in
idiosyncratic productivity, inventory stocks, and JIT adoption status. All markets
are perfectly competitive.
The representative household is endowed with one unit of time in each period and
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values consumption and leisure according to the following preferences:12
U(Ct, N
h
t ) = log(Ct) + φ(1−Nht ),
where φ > 0 denotes the household’s labor disutility. Total hours worked is denoted
by Nht and labor is paid wage, wt. In addition to wage income, the household earns
a dividend each period from ownership of firms, Dt, and chooses savings on a one
period riskless bond, Bt+1, given interest rate Rt+1. The representative household,








subject to its budget constraint which holds for all t,
Ct +Bt+1 ≤ RtBt + wtNht +Dt.
The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s subjective discount factor.
The representative intermediate goods firm produces materials using capital Kt
and labor Lt according to:





Taking prices as given, the problem of the intermediate goods firm is:
max
Kt,Lt
qtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt −RtKt,
where qt denotes the price of the intermediate good.
Finally, a continuum of final goods firms produce using materials, mt, and labor,
12Rogerson (1988) microfounds these preferences in a model of indivisible labor and lotteries.
These preferences provide tractability and are common in the literature, e.g. Gilchrist, Sim, and
Zakrajsek (2014); Ottonello and Winberry (2020); Senga (2018).
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t , θn + θm < 1,
where idiosyncratic productivity evolves as an AR(1) in logs:
log(zt+1) = ρz log(zt) + σzεt, εt ∼ N (0, 1).
Materials are drawn from the firm’s existing inventory stock, st, to use in production.
Final goods firms procure new materials from the intermediate goods firm subject to
a stochastic fixed order cost drawn from a uniform distribution.
Figure 1·1 details the final goods producers’ decision-making timeline. Each period
is broken into three stages. A producer enters the period with realized productivity,
zt, inventory stock, st, and adoption status, at. In the first stage, the producer decides
whether or not to adopt JIT. If a producer does not enter the period as a continuing
adopter, it must pay cs in order to initially adopt. Alternatively, if the producer
enters the period as an adopter, it must pay a smaller continuation cost cf < cs in
order to maintain its status as a JIT adopter.
Intuitively, adopting JIT requires that a plant repurpose its shop floor, enter into
long-term contracts with suppliers to fulfill orders in a timely fashion, and possibly
even purchase new technologies to share information with suppliers. The sunk setup
cost, cs, encompasses all of these one-time costs. The continuation cost, cf , embodies
smaller costs for suppliers to participate in timely delivery, costs of training labor on
JIT practices and tasks, and greater attention or communication required to share
information with suppliers.
In the next stage, producers learn their order cost, ξ ∼ U(0, ξ), and decide whether
or not to place an order, ot. JIT producers face a more favorable order cost distribu-
tion, ξA < ξNA. Lastly, following the adoption and the order decisions, final goods
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Figure 1·1: Decisions of Final Goods Firms
Notes: The figure summarizes the order of the decisions made by final goods firms within a period.
producers decide how much to produce.
I characterize the final goods firms’ problem in terms of inventory stocks rather
than specific order or material input choices. In particular, if a firm enters the period
with inventory stock st, its target inventory stock is denoted by s
∗
t . This means
that any orders (if placed) are defined as ot = s
∗
t − st. Following the order decision,
suppose that inventory stock s̃t is carried into the production stage. Materials used in
production are then defined as mt = s̃t− st+1 where st+1 refers to the inventory stock
carried forward into the next period. In what follows, I suppress the time subscript
and instead denote next period variables with a prime.
Stage 1: Adoption Decision
A final goods producer begins the period with (z, s, a) and faces adoption costs
{cs, cf}, denominated in units of labor and endogenous prices, p, q, and w. The
firm first decides whether to adopt JIT. Note that the adoption status is a binary
outcome. The value of adopting is:




V O(z, s, 1, ξ)dH(ξA),
∫








cs if no JIT (a = 0)
cf if JIT (a = 1),
and V O(z, s, a, ξ) refers to the firm’s value in the second stage. The firm’s optimal
adoption policy, a′(z, s, a), solves this maximization.
Stage 2: Order Decision
Given the firm’s order cost draw, ξ, denominated in units of labor, it then decides
whether to place an order, o. If the firm is an adopter, its order cost distribution
is first order stochastically dominated by those of non-adopters. The value in the
second stage is13
V O(z, s, a, ξ) = max
{
− pwξ + pqs+ V ∗(z, s, a, ξ), V P (z, s, a)
}
, (1.5)
where the value of placing an order is
V ∗(z, s, a, ξ) = max
s∗≥s
[
− pqs∗ + V P (z, s∗, a)
]
, (1.6)
and V P (z, s, a) is defined below. The firm’s problem delivers a threshold rule for
placing an order. In particular, a firm places an order if and only if the order cost
draw is lower than a threshold order cost: ξ < ξ∗(z, s, a) where
ξ∗(z, s, a) =
pqs+ V ∗(z, s, a)− V P (z, s, a)
φ
. (1.7)
Stage 3: Production Decision
Upon making an adoption decision and choosing whether to place an order, and if
so what size, the firm decides how much to produce. Suppose that a firm enters this
13The constraint on the order decision allows for only positive orders. In particular, the model
abstracts away from inventory liquidation.
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z, s, a′(z, s, a)
)
if order placed
s if no order placed.
In the production stage, the firm selects labor, n(z, s̃, s′, a), and materials, (s̃ − s′),
to maximize profits. Its value function in the production stage is:
V P (z, s̃, a) = max
s′∈[0,s̃]
π(z, s̃, s′, a) + βE
[




π(z, s̃, s′, a) = p
[
zn(z, s̃, s′, a)θn(s̃− s′)θm − cms′ − wn(z, s̃, s′, a)
]
(1.9)
are period profits. The end of period inventory stock is denoted by s′, and cm is the
carrying cost of unused input inventory, denominated in units of output.
A final goods producer is said to stock out if it enters the period with no inven-
tories, s = 0, and chooses to not place an order. Without inventories the firm has
no material inputs to make use of in the production stage. As a result, it foregoes
production in that period, but can restart production in the future conditional on a
favorable order cost draw.
1.4 Analyzing the Model
The endogenous adoption decision allows the model to replicate important features of
the data, namely, higher profitability and reduced micro volatility among JIT firms.
Since implementing JIT comes at a relatively large sunk cost, not all firms optimally
choose to adopt JIT. Figure 1·2 plots the adoption frontiers for JIT and non-JIT
producers. The black shaded area by the bottom right corner represents the region
of the state space in which non-JIT firms choose to adopt JIT.
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Figure 1·2: Adoption Frontiers
Notes: The figure plots the adoption frontier among JIT and non-JIT firms. The solid shaded area
plots the region of the state space in which non-JIT firms select into adoption. The striped area
along with the shaded area jointly denote the region of the state space in which existing JIT firms
choose to remain adopters.
At the same time, a producer is likely to remain an adopter conditional on already
being one. This is because the continuation cost of retaining JIT is smaller than
the initial sunk cost. Hence, the endogenous adoption decision exhibits persistence.
The larger blue shaded area of Figure 1·2 confirms this intuition. Only the least
productive JIT producers will opt to abandon adoption. Furthermore, the scope for
exiting adoption is increasing in inventory holdings. The selection detailed here could
contribute to the patterns among JIT firms documented in the data. In particular,
the decision to adopt JIT reflects a favorable productivity realization which, when
coupled with lower average order costs, leads firms to reduce inventory stocks and
incur fewer carrying costs thereby generating more output.
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Figure 1·3: Order Probabilities
Notes: The figure plots the probability of placing an order in the order stage as a function of produc-
tivity. Panel (a) plots the probabilities among non-adopters and panel (b) plots the probabilities for
adopters. The solid red line reflects a high inventory establishment in the model while the dashed
blue line reflects a low inventory establishment.
Figure 1·3 shows the probability of placing an order as a function of productivity.
Consistent with the decision to select into adoption, order probabilities are increasing
in productivity and decreasing in inventory holdings. Moreover, the benefits of JIT
adoption can be understood by comparing the two panels. Across both inventory
levels, the probability of placing an order is higher for adopters since they face lower
average order costs. As a result, adopters in the model place smaller and more
frequent orders. This is consistent with the reduction in inventory holdings within
adopters.
Figure 1·4 plots material usage as a function of productivity. Material inputs are
increasing in productivity and inventory holdings. Firms with very low inventory
stocks will tend to exhaust their remaining inventories regardless of their level of
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Figure 1·4: Material Usage
Notes: The figure plots material usage policy functions in the production stage as a function of
productivity. Panel (a) plots the policy among non-adopters and panel (b) plots the policy for
adopters. The solid red line reflects a high inventory establishment in the model while the dashed
blue line reflects a low inventory establishment.
productivity. Furthermore, adopters make greater use of materials when producing
thereby raising output. The flat lines in these policies reflect endogenous decisions
to fully utilize existing inventory stocks in production. Because adopters can restock
more flexibly, due to the lower order costs, they exhaust their inventory stocks more
often. As a result, production among JIT firms tends to be uninterrupted despite
their lower inventory holdings. Both the order threshold and the material input
policy reflect a treatment effect that allows firms to produce at lower costs which in
turn raises firm sales following adoption.
A comparison of outcomes between economies that differ only in the option to
adopt JIT confirms the model-implied benefits to lean production: higher sales and
less volatility. Figure 1·5 visualizes simulation results from such an exercise. The
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figure plots a plant’s simulated path in both models. The plant in each economy
faces the same productivity realizations.
Upon adopting JIT, the establishment retains its status as an adopter through
the rest of the simulated path despite lower productivity realizations in the latter
periods. This enables the establishment to undertake production despite holding
fewer inventories. The cost savings associated with JIT allow the firm to redirect its
resources to production rather than order placing or inventory storage. As a result,
sales are higher among JIT firms.
Furthermore, upon adopting JIT, the plant’s simulated path for orders is smoothed
considerably relative to the economy without adoption. This illustrates the insight
that JIT mutes the inventory cycle. Because adopters face lower fixed order costs,
their target inventory stocks are lower in the JIT model and the frequency of placing
an order increases. The smoother path for orders also smooths firm sales which can
explain the lower variance of outcomes among adopters in the data.
The fourth panel of the figure, however, points to the source of exposure to un-
expected shocks. Since adopters hold little to no inventory stocks, an unanticipated
supply chain disruption that prevents the establishment from acquiring materials in
a given period will disrupt its production process. On the other hand, the same plant
in the no JIT economy will on average have a larger buffer of inventories from which
to draw when producing amid such an event.
1.5 Structural Estimation
I structurally estimate the model using the micro data analyzed in Section 1.2. The
estimated model captures important features of the firm-level data including the adop-
tion frequency, levels of and covariances between inventories and sales, and spikes in
inventory holdings. Importantly, the estimated model allows me to quantify benefits
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Figure 1·5: Adoption Mutes the Inventory Cycle
Notes: The figure plots the path of a selected establishment in the unconditional simulation. The
top panel plots the (shared) path of idiosyncratic productivity across both models. The second
panel plots the plant’s JIT adoption status, the third panel plots orders, the fourth plots inventory
holdings, and the bottom panel plots sales.
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to JIT in normal times as well as the vulnerabilities that it exposes to unanticipated
macro shocks.
The comprehensive search of firm financials and public statements ensures that
the data on JIT adoption do not include false positives. However, information on JIT
implementation is constrained to what is reported in these records. To allow for the
possibility that JIT is more widespread than the empirical frequency of adoption in
my sample, I use the structure of the model in order to infer patterns of adoption. I do
so by defining a parameter, τ ∈ [0, 1], that governs the share of observed non-adopters
from a simulated panel of firms.14
Of the 13 model parameters listed in Tables 2.5 and 1.6, I first externally calibrate
five of them based on standard parameterizations in the literature. Table 2.5 details
the annual calibration. The discount factor, β is set to 0.962 which is consistent with
a real rate of 4%. The material share, θm, and the capital share, α, are set match
their counterparts in the NBER-CES database for manufacturers from 1980-2011.
The parameter θn is set to match an economy-wide labor share of 0.65. The leisure
preference is calibrated so that the household works about one-third of the time.
1.5.1 Simulated Method of Moments
The parameter vector to be estimated is θ =
(
ρz σz ξNA ξA cs cf cm τ
)′
. These
parameters residing in θ govern the exogenous productivity process, the stochastic
orders costs, the sunk and carrying costs, and the share of observed non-JIT firms.
The model has no closed form solution, so I solve it using standard numerical dynamic
programming techniques detailed in Appendix A.1. To parameterize the model, I
employ SMM (Bazdresch, Kahn, & Whited, 2018; Duffie & Singleton, 1993). This
is done by computing a set of targeted moments in the model and minimizing the
14As in my sample, a firm in the model is said to be an adopter if at least one of its establishments
adopts JIT. Upon simulating a panel of firms, a share τ , are designated non-adopters irrespective of
their true adoption status.
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Table 1.5: External Parameterization
Description Parameter Value Notes
Discount Factor β 0.962 Real rate equal to 4%
Material share θm 0.520 NBER-CES (1980-2011)
Capital share α 0.350 NBER-CES (1980-2011)
Labor share θn 0.245 Labor share equal to 0.65
Labor disutility φ 2.400 Work one third of time
Notes: The table reports the five calibrated parameters for the model.
weighted distance between the empirical moments and their model-based analogs.
Specifically, I target 11 moments to estimate the eight parameters. My estimator is
therefore an overidentified SMM estimator. The first targeted moment is the empirical
frequency of adoption. Of the remaining ten moments, five are specific to JIT firms
and five to non-JIT firms. These five moments, which are the same across both types
of firms, are: the mean inventory-to-sales ratio, the covariance matrix of inventory-to-
sales ratios and log sales which deliver three moments, and the frequency of positive
inventory-to-sales ratio spikes, defined as instances in which the inventory-to-sales
ratio exceeds 0.25.15 I specify the asymptotically efficient choice of the weighting
matrix which is the inverse of the covariance matrix of the moments.
1.5.2 Informativeness of Moments
The choice of moments is crucial for the identification of the parameters, so I dis-
cuss their informativeness in turn. While the targeted moments jointly determine
the parameters to be estimated, there are nonetheless moments that are especially
informative in pinning down certain parameters.
Idiosyncratic productivity persistence mostly informs the covariance between inventory-
15The empirical moments are listed in the third column of Table 1.7.
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to-sales and log sales among adopters. An increase in ρz implies that a firm with a
favorable productivity realization will select into adoption, reduce its inventory hold-
ings due to the lower average fixed order costs, and experience higher sales. As a
result, the covariance between inventory-to-sales and log sales among adopters be-
comes more negative. Moreover, idiosyncratic productivity dispersion mostly affects
variances, for instance the variance of inventory-to-sales among non-adopters, as an
increase in σz results in more dispersed outcomes among producers.
An increase in the upper support of the order cost distribution for non-adopters
primarily raises the inventory-to-sales ratio for JIT firms. Intuitively, higher order
costs among non-JIT producers expands the area representing the adoption fron-
tier for non-JIT producers in Figure 1·2, leading more firms to select into adoption.
These new adopters are less productive and hold more inventories which raises the
overall inventory-to-sales ratio among adopters. On the other hand, an increase in
the upper support of the order cost distribution for adopters primarily raises the
inventory-to-sales ratio among non-JIT firms. When average fixed order costs rise
among adopters, the returns to continued adoption fall leading less productive and
more bloated producers abandon JIT thereby raising inventory-to-sales ratios among
non-adopters.
An increase in the sunk cost of adoption primarily raises the variance of log sales
among adopters since it raises the returns to continued adoption. In other words, ex-
isting adopters are willing to tolerate more dispersed productivity realizations before
abandoning JIT. An increase in the continuation cost of adoption primarily reduces
the scope for remaining a JIT producer. More bloated, less productive firms will
therefore abandon JIT, leading to an increase in spike rates among non-adopters.
On the other hand, an increase in the carrying cost of inventories leads all firms to
lean out, thereby reducing spike rates. Finally, a rise in the the share of observed
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Table 1.6: Estimated Parameters
Description Parameter Estimate
Idiosyncratic productivity persistence ρz 0.878
(0.059)
Idiosyncratic productivity dispersion σz 0.044
(0.017)
Order cost distribution (non-adopters) ξNA 0.483
(0.029)
Order cost distribution (adopters) ξA 0.047
(0.010)
Sunk cost of adoption cs 0.293
(0.087)
Continuation cost of adoption cf 0.110
(0.012)
Carrying cost cm 0.182
(0.046)
Observed share of non-adopters τ 0.938
(0.012)
Notes: The table reports the estimated parameters with standard errors in parentheses.
non-adopters primarily reduces the frequency of adoption.
Figure A1 in Appendix A.1 outlines these key monotonic relationships between
the moments and the parameters. In addition, Figure A2 helps assess the sources of
identification by reporting the sensitivity of each of the eight parameters to changes
in a given moment, based on Andrews, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017). These figures
confirm the intuition laid out above.
1.5.3 Estimation Results
Table 1.6 reports the estimated parameters, all of which are precisely estimated. The
estimated technology parameters, ρz and σz, are consistent with parameterizations in
the literature (Hennessy & Whited, 2007; Khan & Thomas, 2008; Meier, 2020),
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collectively ranging from 0.68-0.89 and 0.02-0.12 respectively. My estimates imply
a more persistent and less dispersed idiosyncratic productivity process than that
estimated in Clementi, Castro, and Lee (2015) which is likely due to the fact that
my sample consists of publicly traded Compustat manufacturers who are larger and
older than the universe of manufacturers.
The upper support of the order cost distribution among non-adopters is estimated
to be an order of magnitude larger than that of adopters. These order cost estimates
imply that non-JIT firms place orders that are about five times larger than those
of JIT firms, indicating a sizable return to adoption for those who can initiate it.
Furthermore, the adoption cost estimates suggest a great deal of hysteresis in the
adoption decision. In particular, firms pay a continuation cost that is slightly more
than one third of the original sunk cost. Conditional on being an adopter, the proba-
bility of remaining an adopter is 91%. This estimate is similar to estimates of the sunk
cost of exporting, which place the probability of remaining an exporter conditional
on already being one at 87% (Alessandria & Choi, 2007). The estimated carrying
cost is about 15% of the total value of sales, a non-negligible amount that prevents
firms from storing too many inventories across periods. Lastly, the estimated share
of observed non-adopters implies that the mass of JIT establishments in the model’s
steady state is about 0.15.
Given that I target 11 moments to estimate the eight parameters, the model is
overidentified and will not exactly match the empirical moments. With that said, the
overidentified SMM procedure fits the data well. Table 1.7 compares the 11 targeted
moments generated by the model with their empirical values. Importantly, the model
replicates important features between adopters and non-adopters. Relative to non-
JIT firms, adopters hold fewer inventories as a share of their sales. In addition,
adopters are broadly characterized by less variable outcomes and a looser association
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Table 1.7: Model vs. Empirical Moments
Moment Model Data
Mean(inventory-sales ratio|adopter) 0.169 0.146
(0.005)
Mean(inventory-sales ratio|non-adopter) 0.191 0.194
(0.002)
z Std(inventory-sales ratio|adopter) 0.059 0.042
(0.0002)
Corr(inventory-sales ratio, log sales|adopter) -0.185 -0.215
(0.001)
Std(log sales|adopter) 0.234 0.189
(0.014)
Std(inventory-sales ratio|non-adopter) 0.071 0.067
(0.0001)
Corr(inventory-sales ratio, log sales|non-adopter) -0.374 -0.328
(0.0004)
Std(log sales|non-adopter) 0.277 0.263
(0.005)
Spike(inventory-sales ratio|adopter) 0.089 0.071
(0.015)
Spike(inventory-sales ratio|non-adopter) 0.217 0.223
(0.005)
Frequency of adoption 0.048 0.050
(0.005)
Notes: The table reports model-based and empirical moments with standard errors in parentheses.
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between inventory-to-sales ratios and log sales. Lastly, adopters exhibit fewer spikes
in inventory holdings relative to their sales.
As JIT has become more common over time, an economy with fewer adopters is a
natural benchmark against which to compare the estimated model. I exploit the ear-
lier years of my sample, 1980-1989, in order to define this counterfactual. Specifically,
I hold all parameters of the estimated model fixed except for the adoption costs cs and
cf . I estimate these two costs based on the earlier period of my sample. The resulting
estimates for the adoption costs are cs = 0.237 and cf = 0.123, which implies a lower
frequency of adoption. The model reflecting these earlier-period adoption costs will
serve as my counterfactual comparison for the estimated economy throughout the
discussion below.16 17
1.5.4 Nontargeted Moments
To further assess the estimated model’s ability to reproduce the patterns present in
the data, I run empirical regressions based on a panel of simulated firms from both
the estimated and counterfactual models. The results are reported in Table 1.8. The
regressions in Panel A are identical to those in Table 1.1 while the regressions in Panel
B are identical to those in Table 1.2.
Following adoption, the estimated model is able to successfully reproduce reduc-
tions in inventory-to-sales ratios. The OLS coefficients from both models reside within
the 95% confidence interval for the point estimate in the data of -0.155. In addition,
the estimated and the counterfactual models both predict an increase in sales among
adopters, with the estimated model delivering a closer match to the empirical coef-
16Appendix A.1 fully details the subperiod estimation results and counterfactual economy param-
eterization. Appendix A.1 also describes an alternate counterfactual in which I re-estimate the order
costs in addition to the adoption costs with no meaningful changes to the results.
17Intuitively, this counterfactual captures changes in the incentives to adopt JIT based on observed
successes of Toyota’s Kanban system, or new cohorts of managers having been trained on this type
of production system.
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Table 1.8: Model-Based Regressions
Panel A: Levels
Inventory-to-sales Sales
Data -0.155 (0.035) 0.092 (0.025)
Estimated -0.142 (0.003) 0.098 (0.003)
Counterfactual -0.165 (0.003) 0.123 (0.002)
Panel B: Volatility
Employment growth Sales growth
Data -0.079 (0.041) -0.087 (0.032)
Estimated -0.099 (0.007) -0.087 (0.007)
Counterfactual -0.117 (0.007) -0.098 (0.007)
Notes: The table reports empirical and model-based panel regressions at the firm level from the
estimated and counterfactual models with standard errors in parentheses. Panel A reports regression
results as in Table 1.1. Panel B reports regression results as in Table 1.2.
ficient. Moreover, both models predict reductions in firm volatility among adopters,
with the estimated model providing a closer fit to the coefficient of employment growth
volatility and an exact match to sales growth volatility. With precisely estimated pa-
rameters delivering a broadly successful fit to the data, and a relevant counterfactual
defined, I can now exploit this structure as a laboratory for quantitative experiments.
1.6 Quantifying the Tradeoff
Having estimated the model, I proceed to quantify the tradeoff between the long-run
gains to JIT and the vulnerability to unanticipated disasters that JIT exposes. I first
examine the model’s steady state to characterize the benefits of lean production. I
then analyze the dynamics of the estimated economy following a COVID-19 disaster.
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Table 1.9: Long-Run Aggregates Across Models
Panel A: Levels
Output Order frequency Order size Price of orders
0.79 7.65 -4.68 0.72
Inventory stock Firm value Measured TFP Welfare
-10.56 0.95 0.23 0.57
Panel B: Volatility
MP materials Sales Labor
-5.01 -9.22 -8.91
Notes: The table reports steady state values of the estimated model relative to the counterfactual
model, in percent deviations. Panel A reports the levels of aggregates. Panel B reports measures of
firm volatility from unconditional simulation of 40,000 firms over 50 periods.
1.6.1 Steady State
A comparison between the two models points to sizable gains associated with JIT
adoption. Table 1.9 reports the steady state in the estimated model relative to the
counterfactual economy in percent deviations. The higher prevalence of adoption in
the estimated model implies smaller, more frequent orders placed such that order
demand rises.
As expected, inventory holdings fall in the estimated model. The reduction in
inventories is due to a decrease in target inventory stocks across all producers.18
Relative to the counterfactual, the estimated model delivers a roughly 11% decline in
the real aggregate inventory-to-sales ratio, a figure that can account for the observed
reduction in the macroeconomic time series from 1992-2019. In addition, firm value
rises by about 1% in the estimated model. For reference, the literature measures
firm value losses of 2% due to biases in managerial beliefs (Barrero, 2020) and 3%
due to CEO turnover frictions (Taylor, 2010). Welfare in the estimated model is
0.6% higher in consumption equivalent terms, a magnitude comparable to the costs
18Non-JIT producers also reduce their inventory targets due to the rise in the price of orders.
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of business cycles (Krusell, Mukoyama, Sahin, & Smith, 2009) and the costs of
managerial short-termism (Terry, 2017).
Fixed order costs are a source of misallocation in the model. Ideally firms would
like to hold no material inventories, instead placing orders and fully utilizing them
when producing every period. In an effort to minimize the number of times the
fixed order costs are incurred, producers hold non-zero inventories. For this reason,
the estimated JIT adoption model implies a reduction in misallocation. With more
adoption, a greater number of producers operate subject to lower order costs. At
the aggregate level, this implies that resources are reallocated to high marginal prod-
uct producers. In essence, firms place more frequent orders and therefore have the
flexibility to better align their material usage with their realized micro productivity
realizations. The estimated model implies that JIT adoption raises measured TFP
by approximately 0.2%.
The reduction in misallocation manifests itself in lower firm volatility, consistent
with Figure 1·5. Panel B of Table 1.9 reports results from an unconditional simulation
of firms at the steady state. The variance in marginal product of materials falls in the
estimated model relative to the counterfactual model. Furthermore, sales volatility in
the estimated model falls by 9% relative to the counterfactual model. For reference,
the same reduction in firm sales volatility would be achieved in a model without any
JIT and a roughly 45% reduction in order costs.
1.6.2 Effects of an Unanticipated Disaster
I next show that despite enjoying higher profits and smoother firm-level outcomes,
an economy populated by lean producers is more vulnerable to an unexpected disas-




Figure 1·6: Deeper Crisis with More Adoption
Notes: The figure plots the output response to a productivity shock that matches the 9.5% year-
over-year decline in real GDP in 2020Q2.
Whereas in the steady state A = 1, in a disaster episode A unexpectedly falls
below one. I shock this parameter so as to match the 9.5% drop in year-over-year
real GDP in the second quarter of 2020. I consider a disaster duration such that
the economy returns to its steady state after three years.19 Figure 1·6 displays the
endogenous output response to this unexpected disaster. In addition, Figure 1·7
reports the key differences in endogenous responses between the two models over the
full disaster path. Consistent with the burgeoning literature that studies COVID-19,
I model the disaster as an unanticipated event (Arellano et al., 2020; Espino et al.,
2020). In Appendix A.1, I show that my quantitative results are robust to allowing
19As rare disasters are inherently infrequent, the number of such events is limited in short samples.
Here I follow Barro and Ursua (2008) who report a mean duration of 3.5 years from a cross-country
panel of disasters. I consider alternate durations in Appendix A.1 with little impact on the qualitative
conclusions.
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Figure 1·7: More Stock Outs and Inventory Hoarding
Notes: The figure plots the responses of key endogenous variables over the course of the simulated
disaster in the estimated economy relative to the counterfactual economy (in percentage points).
for anticipation.
Overall, the estimated model sees a 1.6 percentage point sharper output contrac-
tion on impact than the counterfactual model. During an unexpected disaster, the
shadow value of inventories rises leading firms to reduce order sizes. Since firms in
the JIT economy are leaner on average, the JIT economy experiences a 7.5 percentage
point sharper spike in stock outs. At the same time, despite a reduction in inventory
stocks in both economies, firms in the JIT economy place fewer orders and draw in-
ventories down more slowly. As a result, these firms necessarily make use of fewer
material inputs in production and sales therefore contract more sharply in the JIT
model. In particular material input use falls 1.8 percentage points more over the
course of the disaster in the estimated JIT economy.
A seemingly minor change to JIT adoption incentives across the two models deliv-
ers a substantial difference in the extent to which the economy falls into crisis amid a
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Figure 1·8: Micro Stability vs. Macro Vulnerability
(a) Sales Volatility (b) Firm Profits
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) plot the magnitude of GDP contraction conditional on a 3-year disaster on
the horizontal axis. Panel (a) plots an index of equilibrium firm sales volatility on the vertical axis
(relative to the counterfactual economy defined above) while Panel (b) plots an index of equilibrium
firm profits on the vertical axis (relative to the counterfactual economy defined above). Each point
represents a different counterfactual economy, with the estimated economy denoted by the red circle
and the counterfactual described in the text denoted by the blue square. The sunk cost parameters
(cs, cf ) are varied in order to generate the other counterfactual economies. The curve is a polynomial
interpolation of the set of counterfactuals.
disaster. The excess output loss amounts to approximately $300 billion, a figure com-
parable to the funds allocated for direct cash payments to households following the
passage of the CARES Act.20 Lean inventory management therefore plays a mean-
ingful role in determining the vulnerability of the economy to unanticipated shocks.
During large unexpected disasters, inventories can in fact serve as a stabilizing force.
1.6.3 The JIT Tradeoff
Having examined the effects of lean inventory management on the economy in normal
times as well as amid a COVID-19-magnitude disaster, I next trace out frontiers that
illustrate the micro-macro tradeoff associated with JIT for a range of counterfactual
economies. These frontiers point to an economically important tradeoff and imply
that inventory management is an important source of aggregate fluctuations amid
20Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, H.R. 748, 116th Congress (2020).
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large unexpected shocks.
Panel (a) of Figure 1·8 plots the tradeoff between firm sales volatility and the
magnitude of the GDP contraction on impact for several counterfactual economies,
each differing in steady state mass of JIT firms. Each point on the curve refers to
a specific parameterized economy, traced out by varying the adoption costs, cs and
cf . The red circle denotes the estimated economy and the blue square denotes the
counterfactual. The panel shows that micro volatility falls with more JIT adoption,
at the risk of elevated vulnerability to a shock. A 9% reduction in firm volatility
comes at the cost of a 1.6 percentage point sharper GDP contraction.
Panel (b) of Figure 1·8 plots a similar tradeoff, this time comparing steady state
firm profits with the magnitude of the GDP contraction. The curve slopes upward,
as steady state firm profits are increasing in adoption while the extent to which the
economy is vulnerable to an unanticipated shock also rises. A 0.6% increase in firm
profits comes at the cost of a 1.6 percentage point sharper GDP contraction. For
reference, the same increase in firm profits would arise in a model with no JIT and
a 55% reduction in economy-wide order costs. The ranges of this frontier imply an
economically large tradeoff between measures of micro stability or profitability and
macro vulnerability.
1.7 Conclusion
At the firm level, it pays to be lean. I provide empirical evidence of the benefits of
JIT inventory management among publicly traded manufacturers. Upon adopting
JIT, firms hold fewer inventories, and observe higher sales and smoother outcomes.
JIT firms, however, appear to be more cyclical and susceptible to disaster episodes.
In a rich model of JIT production, the most productive firms adopt JIT which raises
long-run firm value by 1% and reduces firm volatility by 9%. At the same time,
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JIT elevates firm vulnerability due to low inventory buffers. Amid an unexpected
disaster, output in the estimated JIT economy contracts 1.6 percentage points more
than a counterfactual economy with less JIT. Adoption, therefore, gives rise to an
important and previously undocumented tradeoff which implies that inventories can
indeed matter for aggregate fluctuations. Economists interested in understanding
fluctuations within firms, and the responsiveness of the economy to aggregate shocks,






Professional forecasts exhibit error predictability. Specifically, the covariance between
ex-post errors and ex-ante revisions is non-zero and can run in either direction. A
negative covariance is interpreted as an overreaction whereas a positive covariance
is interpreted as an underreaction. At the same time, macroeconomic and financial
time series have been found to exhibit complex dynamics such as stochastic volatility,
structural breaks, and regime switching. Whereas existing models of belief formation
do not generally accommodate simultaneous over- and underreactions, I show that
these patterns can arise in an otherwise standard noisy information setting that incor-
porates unobserved time-varying volatility and heterogeneous forecasting techniques.
Error predictability in the model arises due to updating mistakes committed by
forecasters. With unobserved volatility, the optimal weight to place on new infor-
mation is not exactly known. In addition, there are costs associated with devising
quantitative predictions. For instance, producing a forecast requires (computing)
time and cognitive effort. To the extent that macroeconomic dynamics vary in their
complexity, it stands to reason that forecasters tailor their models to each time se-
ries. Furthermore, subject to these costs, forecasters may select simpler misspecified
models. Therefore with time-varying volatility and heterogeneous forecasting models,
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revisions can hold predictive power over errors, and the nature of this relationship
can be variable-specific. In spite of this, my framework is compatible with rationality
in the sense that reported forecasts are optimal outcomes.
Survey data has traditionally been used to test theories of expectation formation.
In this paper, I make use of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) which pro-
vides a panel of multi-horizon forecasts across several macroeconomic variables.1 In
the data, over- and underreactions arise along different dimensions. First, across levels
of aggregation, consensus forecasts broadly exhibit underreactions while forecaster-
level predictions tend to imply overreactions. Second, across variables and forecasters,
overreactions appear for some variables and underreactions for others. Both of these
facts have been previously documented in the literature. This paper offers a third
empirical fact: across variable, within forecaster, the same respondent appears to
over- and underreact to distinct macroeconomic variables.
The presence of simultaneous over- and underreactions prompts several funda-
mental questions about belief formation. Are professional forecasters, presumably
the most informed private agents in the economy, rational? Alternatively, do behav-
ioral biases govern the manner in which expectations are formed? As policymakers
increasingly pursue expectations-based policies such as forward guidance, taking a
step toward reconciling theories of expectations formation with the data is of first-
order importance.
Against this backdrop, I develop a noisy information model with unobserved time-
varying volatility. Rather than obtaining an exact solution to the optimal inference
problem, forecasters must approximate the posterior distribution. They may choose
from a finite set of approximation methods. The available methods vary in complexity,
and adopting a given method is subject to a cost that is increasing in forecasting
1Examples other than the SPF include the Livingston survey, the Michigan Survey of Consumers,
the NY Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations, Blue Chip forecasts, the ECB Survey of Professional
Forecasters, and the daily Focus Survey from the Central Bank of Brazil, among others.
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model sophistication. Forecasters generate a prediction that minimizes the sum of
their mean squared errors and model adoption costs.
Importantly, some forecasters adopt suboptimal forecasting models to predict vari-
ables thereby generating error predictability. I consider a stylized version of this un-
observed volatility model in which forecasters can select either a suboptimal Kalman
filter or an asymptotically efficient particle filter, the former being less costly to adopt
than the latter.2 I find that the underlying signal-to-noise ratio governs the extent to
which over- and underreactions arise. Intuitively, the optimal weight to place on new
information is increasing in the time-varying signal-to-noise ratio. Predictions based
on the suboptimal model, however, erroneously update new information in a constant
fashion. As a result, forecasters will tend to underreact to variables for which the
average signal-to-noise ratio is high, and will overreact to variables for which the av-
erage signal-to-noise ratio is low. Put another way, there are certain features inherent
to a given macroeconomic time series that explain why forecasters appear to either
over- or underreact to that particular variable.
After providing simulation results that confirm the above intuition, I examine
these implications in the data by exploiting the cross-section of macroeconomic vari-
ables for which forecasters report predictions in the SPF. I then parameterize the
stylized model and show that it can match a quantitatively relevant share of simul-
taneous over- and underreactions. Taken together, my findings demonstrate that
time-varying volatility, coupled with costly forecast model adoption, can rationalize
important features of survey expectations data.
In their seminal paper, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015), henceforth CG, make
sense of forecast error inefficiency while preserving the assumption of rationality. Us-
ing consensus-level data, CG show that projecting ex-post forecast errors on ex-ante
2The particle filter is an asymptotically efficient approximation method. I provide further details
on the filter in Appendix A.2.
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forecast revisions delivers an estimate of information rigidity. More recently, many
studies have used forecaster-level data to test for rationality.3 In doing so, much
of this literature preserves the linearity assumption made in CG, and ultimately re-
jects rational expectations even under imperfect information. To make sense error
predictability at the forecaster-level while also matching the CG finding of under-
reactions at the aggregate level, several theories of non-rational expectations have
been proposed.4 My paper relates to this strand of the literature in many ways, and
provides an alternate interpretation of the errors-on-revisions coefficient.
In a recent contribution, Kohlhas and Walther (2020) also examines simultaneous
over- and underreactions. The authors are able to explain overreaction to news cou-
pled with underreaction on average with a model of asymmetric attention. Although
I ground over- and underreactions from a slightly different empirical perspective, I
view my paper as complementary to theirs. Whereas my model is based on hetero-
geneity in the underlying volatility across state variables, Kohlhas and Walther (2020)
present a model of costly attention which delivers distinct signal precisions for differ-
ent components of the state. In both cases, however, the underlying signal-to-noise
ratio is the relevant object that varies across variables or components.5 This paper
is also related to Gabaix (n.d.) which proposes a model in which agents over- and
underreact due to misperceived persistence of the data generating process. The focus
of my model, however, is in how forecasters assess volatility. Nonetheless, my model
can in general speak to sources of misperceived persistence, for example, unobserved
structural breaks.
3Examples include Bordalo, Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer (2020), Fuhrer (2018), Dovern, Fritsche,
Loungani, and Tamirisa (2015), Andrade and Bihan (2013), Broer and Kohlhas (2019), Bürgi (2016).
4For instance Bordalo et al. (2020) rule out rationality in favor of diagnostic expectations. Other
studies such as Fuster, Hebert, and Laibson (2012a) argue in favor of models featuring misperception
at long horizons. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) argues for a model of overconfidence
while Broer and Kohlhas (2019) present a model of relative overconfidence.
5Relatedly, Broer and Kohlhas (2019) present a model of over- and underreactions. The focus in
this paper is to match simultaneous over- and underreactions to endogenous public signals.
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Moreover, the unobserved volatility noisy information model in this paper is in
the spirit of Branch (2004), Evans and Ramey (1992) and Brock and Hommes (1997)
who define adaptively rational equilibrium dynamics (ARED). Branch (2004) was
the first to introduce this concept to expectations formation. My paper builds on his
important insights in key ways. First, I present more complex dynamics for the state
variable. Introducing nonlinearities, such as stochastic volatility, provides an even
stronger justification for the use of different predictor functions. Second, I explic-
itly model heterogenous expectations through private information whereas in Branch
(2004) predictions are assumed to be homogeneous among all who adopt a specific
predictor function.6 Taken together, my model is able to reproduce the empirical
facts relating to simultaneous over- and underreactions across level of aggregation, by
variable across forecasters, and by variable within forecaster.
While a discussion of nonlinearities has generally been absent in the survey ex-
pectations literature, the finance literature has previously tied nonlinear dynamics to
error predictability. For instance, Lewis (1989) considers error predictability concern-
ing dollar forecasts in the context of a structural break. Veronesi (2015) finds that
over- and underreactions arise in a regime switching model of asset pricing. More
recently, Lansing, LeRoy, and Ma (2020) attribute the predictability of excess returns
to either volatility or deviations from rationality. To this end, my paper also relates
to the literature on volatility in macroeconomics.7
Finally, due to the assumptions imposed on the state dynamics, this paper relates
to the literature on nonlinear filtering. Several approximation methods have been
devised in order to deal with nonlinearities in the evolution of a state variable. These
methods include generalizations to Kalman filtering as well as importance sampling
6Heterogeneity in this model comes from idiosyncratic “trembles” in the reported prediction.
7See for instance, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (2000), and Stock and Watson (2007)
42
algorithms, among others.8 A strand of this literature has formalized some basic
efficiency properties of particle filtering.9
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents previously
documented facts about error predictability at the forecaster and consensus levels, as
well as a novel fact pertaining to simultaneous over- and underreactions. Section 2.3
presents the noisy information model subject to unobserved time-varying volatility.
Section 2.4 introduces a stylized version of the model and provides simulation results.
Section 2.5 documents empirical evidence consistent with the model. Section 2.6
parameterizes the stylized model to show that it can generate within forecaster over-
and underreactions. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Evidence from Survey Data
The SPF is a quarterly survey provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
The survey began in 1968Q4 and provides forecasts from several forecasters across a
number of macroeconomic variables over many horizons, h. The variables of interest
in this paper are the forecast error and the forecast revision. To construct forecast
errors from forecaster i about variable x,
FEit+h,t = xt+h − xit+h|t,
I take the difference between the realized real-time value for x at t+ h and the fore-
caster’s h-step ahead prediction generated at time t. To compute forecast revisions,




8Julier and Uhlmann (2004) develop a Kalman filter for nonlinear settings while Doucet and
Johansen (2009) discuss particle filtering methods.
9See Crisan and Doucet (2002) and Hu, Schon, and Ljung (2011)
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Table 2.1: Pooled OLS Forecast Error Predictability Regressions
Nowcast One-Quarter Ahead Two-Quarters Ahead
β1 α1 β1 α1 β1 α1
Estimate -0.317*** 0.569*** -0.231** 1.011*** -0.344*** 0.565**
(0.050) (0.128) (0.067) (0.201) (0.058) (0.272)
Observations 65,070 2,323 54,067 2,309 52,220 2,295
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients of forecast error predictability at the current,
one-, and two-quarter ahead horizons. Across all horizons, column (1), refers to the forecaster-level
errors-on-revisions regression. Column (2) refers to the consensus-level errors-on-revisions regression.
Standard errors for forecaster-level regressions are as in Driscoll and Kraay (1998), while Newey-
West standard errors are used for aggregate-level specifications. Data used for estimation come from
SPF. *** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance, and * denotes 10% significance.
This requires making use of the h-step ahead forecasts formulated in periods t and
t− 1. In other words, I consider the fixed horizon, h and take the difference between
two adjacent forecasts.
In the data, simultaneous over- and underreactions arise along different dimen-
sions: across level of aggregation, across SPF variables pooled over forecasters, and
across SPF variables within forecaster. CG present the following testable implication
at the consensus-level which holds for an arbitrary horizon:
FEt+h,t = α0 + α1FRt+h,t + εt. (2.1)
CG find that in the data, α1 > 0 for most variables which indicates that consensus
forecasts underreact to new information. More recently, Bordalo et al. (2020) estimate
the same regression at the forecaster-level:





and find that β1 < 0 for most macroeconomic series. The interpretation is that
forecasters overreact to new information.
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Table 2.2: Pooled OLS Regressions at h = 0, by Variable
Variable Mnemonic β1 α1
Consumer price inflation CPI -0.085 0.868***
Employment EMP -0.123 0.564***
Housing starts HOUSING 0.063 0.359***
Industrial production IP -0.147* 0.513***
Nominal GDP NGDP -0.310*** 0.421**
GDP Deflator PGDP -0.363*** 0.350**
Real consumption RCONSUM -0.401*** 0.098
Real federal government spending RFEDGOV -0.483*** 0.377
Real GDP RGDP -0.264*** 0.350**
Real nonresidential investment RNRESIN -0.499** 0.362
Real residential investment RRESINV -0.234*** 0.925***
Real state/local government spending RSLGOV -0.660*** -0.381
3-month Treasury bill TBILL 0.010 0.178***
10-year Treasury bond TBOND 0.020 0.154***
Unemployment rate UNEMP 0.082** 0.247***
Notes: The table reports the OLS coefficients from errors-on-revisions regressions across 15 macroe-
conomic variables reported in the Survey of Professional Forecaters. Column (3) reports the coeffi-
cient in front of the revision at the forecaster-level while column (4) reports the analogous coefficient
using consensus-level data. The errors and revisions are for current period forecasts (h = 0). All
forecasts refer to growth rates with the exception of consumer price inflation (CPI), 3-month trea-
sury bill (TBILL), 10-year bond (TBOND), and unemployment rate (UNEMP). *** denotes 1%
significance, ** denotes 5% significance, and * denotes 10% significance.
Table 2.1 reports estimates of β1 and α1, using data from the SPF. The estimates
are obtained via OLS regressions, pooling across both forecasters and macroeconomic
variables. Estimates are reported for three different horizons. Across all horizons
considered, it is clear that overreactions dominate at the individual-level, while un-
derreactions arise at the aggregate-level.
However even at the forecaster-level there is evidence of simultaneous over- and
underreactions across macroeconomic variables. Table 2.2 reports variable-by-variable
results for nowcasts (h = 0) at the forecaster- and consensus-levels. The results point
to individual overreactions for most variables but underreactions for some variables
such as the unemployment rate.
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These findings are neither driven by entry and exit among SPF forecasters, nor
different forecasters systematically reporting predictions for select macroeconomic
variables. Instead, the same respondent simultaneously over- and underreacts to
distinct macroeconomic variables. To show this, I estimate regression (2.2) for each
forecaster i forecasting a specific variable j. This delivers an Ni × Nj matrix of
estimates β̂1,ij. I keep only those estimates that are significant at the 5% level. I then
fix a pair of SPF variables j and k, and compute the number of forecasters such that
β̂1,ij < 0 and β̂1,ik > 0, and normalize by the number of total forecasters reporting
predictions about variables j and k. More formally, I estimate a matrix P whose





β̂1,ij < 0 and β̂1,ik > 0
)
min{Nj, Nk}
where Nx denotes the number of forecasters providing predictions of variable x and
1(·) is the indicator function. The elements of matrix P , therefore, denote the share
of forecasters who simultaneously overreact to the row variable and underreact to the
column variable. When pjk is close to one, this means that nearly all forecasters over-
react to variable j and underreact to variable k. On the other hand, when pjk is close
to zero, then almost no forecaster overreacts to variable j while also underreacting to
variable k.
Figure 2·1 reports the results from this exercise. The heatmap verifies that a given
forecaster tends to overreact to some variables and underreact to others. For instance,
84% of professional forecasters exhibit overreactions when forecasting growth in real
gross domestic product (RGDP) while simultaneously underreacting to information
regarding inflation based on the consumer price index (CPI).
In order to understand how individuals formulate these expectations, a theory of
expectations formation must take into account that a single agent may overreact and
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Figure 2·1: Frequency of Over- and Underreaction
Notes: The heatmap displays the share of forecasters who overreact to the row variable and simul-
taneously underreact to the column variable.
underreact to different variables. I propose a model of time-varying volatility and
heterogeneity in forecasting models in order to account for this fact.
2.3 Model
I begin with a simple regime switching example to highlight the intuition. I then
proceed to develop a generalized noisy information rational expectations model with
unobserved time-varying volatility and heterogeneous forecasting methods. In the
next section, I narrow my focus to a stylized version of this model which I later
parameterize.
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2.3.1 A Simple Model
Suppose that the state is described as follows:




σ2L with probability q
σ2H with probability 1− q.
The forecaster cannot directly observe the latent state st or its volatility σ
2
t . More
specifically, the probability q is unknown. Instead, the forecaster receives a signal
each period that is contaminated with noise:
yt = st + vt vt ∼ N (0, σ2v).







Without full knowledge of the probability q, the optimal weighting of new information
is unknown. Suppose that the forecaster finds it too time consuming or otherwise
prohibitive to ascertain q. Instead, the forecaster simply assess the state variance to









The resulting weighting error can be expressed as:





















When σ2t = σ
2
L, the weighting error is negative meaning that the forecaster puts undue
weight on his signal thereby overreacting. On the other hand, when σ2t = σ
2
H , the
weighting error is positive and the forecaster underreacts to new information.
Based on this simple example, the magnitude of the overreaction depends impor-
tantly on the signal-to-noise ratio. Noisier environments deliver more negative β1
coefficients. On the other hand, underreactions arise when q is closer to zero (i.e.,
the underlying signal-to-noise ratio is high). In this case, as the forecaster generates
predictions, he believes the state to be less variable than it truly is thereby placing
less weight on news. This mutes the effects of signal noise and creates more inertia
in expectation formation than is optimal. The result is a more positive β1 coefficient.
The weighting errors in my model stem from: (i) unobserved volatility and (ii)
incentives to adopt parsimonious approximations of the volatility. With these two
assumptions, over- and underreactions can arise depending on the underlying state
dynamics. Assumption (ii) is crucial because if forecasters could easily observe q, then
there would be no need to approximate the variance of the state. In this case, error
orthogonality would hold despite the regime switching nature of the variance. How-
ever, if adopting different forecasting models comes at a cost (be it cognitive, timing,
or otherwise), forecasters may find it optimal to make use of such approximations.
2.3.2 A Model of Unobserved Time-Varying Volatility
Having illustrated the basic intuition that delivers simultaneous over- and underreac-
tions, I now turn to presenting the general model. Nonlinearities such as time-varying
volatility in the underlying state complicates the forecaster’s problem as he must now
formulate expectations about levels and the volatilities. Supposing that there are n
latent state variables and m exogenous signals, the state and observations equations
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are:
st = F (st−1,wt) (2.3)
zit = Cst + Dv
i
t,
where st is an n × 1 vector, zt is m × 1, C is m × n, D is m ×m and vit is m × 1.
There are no other restrictions placed on the model. In particular, st can be a vector
of many different state variables, or lags of itself. Furthermore, zit can include an
arbitrary finite number of observed signals. The noise vector vit can include private
or public noise.10
In a linear model, st = Ast−1 + Bwt. The crucial difference between a linear
model and this one is the unobserved time-varying covariance matrix Bt which implies




. As a result, the error now enters
multiplicatively into the state. This nonlinearity is modeled by the function F (·)
which governs the evolution of the state. While the state now exhibits stochastic
volatility, the shocks remain normal, and the signal structure is unchanged. Hence,
the measurement equation remains linear.11 12
Whereas Kalman filtering delivers an exact optimal solution in a linear Gaussian
environment, it is no longer optimal in this context. The reason for this is that the
Kalman filter requires one to evaluate the expected value of st conditional on the
history of signals Z it = {zi1, . . . , zit}. This is made intractable due to the lack of
knowledge about the underlying conditional distribution. To see this more clearly,
consider the scalar case where the state is st and there is only a private signal available
to the forecaster, zit. The observation equation can be expressed as a conditional
10I index this vector by i in general to allow for forecaster-specific signals.
11This could be generalized to a nonlinear measurement as well. I abstract away from this for
simplicity.
12While I consider stochastic volatility, any nonlinearity can deliver the results presented in the
paper. In particular, this model can also speak to unobserved changes in the persistence of macroe-
conomic time series.
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likelihood, p(zit|st) and the state evolution as p(st+1|st). The optimal filter computes











In a linear Gaussian environment, this can be exactly computed via the Kalman
recursions.13 In a nonlinear setting, however, computing p(st|Z it) is not feasible as
the density cannot be obtained analytically.
In light of this, forecasters must approximate the nonlinear state. I assume that
this is done by selecting from a set of costly approximation functions, A ∈ A. Fore-
casters first select an approximation function so as to obtain an estimate of the
posterior density of the underlying state. Forecasters then report their predictions,
the first moment of this approximated density. Hence, the forecaster’s loss function















where the first term is the mean square error arising from individual i’s forecast
which makes use of approximation function A, and the second term denotes the cost
associated with adopting approximation function A.14 I assume that these forecaster-
specific costs are drawn randomly ciA ∼ U(0, cA).15 This cost embodies unobserved
heterogeneity among forecasters that result in the use of different forecasting models.




t|t is the expected value of the posterior density
and Ψit|t is the variance.
14Forecasters have knowledge of the mean square error associated with each A.
15One could alternatively assume heterogeneous signal precision. Models featuring heterogeneous
signal-to-noise ratios have been proposed in the literature, particularly to explain forecast disagree-
ment.
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After applying their approximations of the state, forecasters generate a prediction
and an update according to the new information received. Since agents are formu-
lating a forecast subject to an approximation of the state, I call these approximate





st p̂(st|Z it) dst. (2.5)
In essence, the forecaster predicts the current state according to the approximated
density p̂(st|Z it). In a linear Gaussian setting, the density would be obtained exactly
so that p̂(st|Z it) = p(st|Z it) and errors would be orthogonal.
One can express the approximate prediction as a deviation from the optimal min-
imum mean square error forecast
ŝ
i




st[p̂(st|Z it)− p(st|Z it)]dst︸ ︷︷ ︸
Approximation error
. (2.6)
Whereas existing theories of expectation formation restrict the deviation from the
optimal forecast to be either positive (overreactions) or negative (underreactions),
the direction of the error here is unrestricted.
2.3.3 Scope for Over- and Underreaction
Error predictability is due to the presence of suboptimal models in the set A. Im-
portantly, some forecasters must select suboptimal approximations from this menu
of models. A sufficient condition for the presence of over- and underreactions is that
some approximation A ∈ A involves a time-invariant weight used to update new
information which resides in the interval (0, 1).
Intuitively, the optimal weight to place on new information is increasing in the
signal-to-noise ratio. If a forecaster partially incorporates the most recent signal with
a naive constant weight, then the forecaster will overweight new information when
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Notes: The figure illustrates the optimal Kalman gain (upward sloping curve) and the suboptimal
Kalman gain (horizontal line) as functions of the signal-to-noise ratio.
signals tend to be imprecise, and will underweight new information when signals tend
to be more precise. Figure 2·2 illustrates this intuition.
The gaps between the curve and the horizontal line reflect weighting errors.
These weighting errors are made each period among those who choose the subop-
timal constant-weight forecasting model. The scope for underreaction rises with the
signal-to-noise ratio.16
The constant weight assumption is made for the purpose of transparency. There
are other forecasting techniques that could deliver misspecified time-varying weights
which could deliver a similar intuition to the one displayed in Figure 2·2.
Aggregate error predictability arises because the consensus revision does not reside
in any forecaster’s information set. Appendix A.2 proves that α1 ≥ β1 which implies
16It is important to note that the optimal weight will vary along the curve according to the
underlying stochastic volatility. Ultimately, the optimal weight is a complicated function of the
volatility and persistence of the state as well as the noisiness of the signals, so the black curve is
specific to the macroeconomic variable in question.
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that underreaction can arise at the aggregate level. Aggregate underreactions arise in
part due to aggregation, but also because not all forecasters adopt suboptimal models
in this noisy information environment.
2.3.4 Relation to Some Theories of Expectation Formation
Amid the mounting evidence against full information rational expectations, several
theories of expectations formation have been proposed in the literature. Here, I
consider a few prominent theories and assess their ability to generate the empirical
facts presented in Section 2.2.17
According to diagnostic expectations, forecasters over-weight new information ac-
cording to a parameter θ > 0 which ultimately governs the extent of overreaction.
This parameter comes from the representativeness heuristic of Tversky and Kahne-






This theory makes use of a distorted Kalman filter called the diagnostic Kalman
filter, which, as shown in Bordalo et al. (2020), is able to generate β1 < 0 and α1 > 0.
Because θ > 0, however, this theory cannot accommodate underreactions. In other
words, the sign restriction imposed on θ implies that diagnostic errors and revisions
always covary negatively.
Models of overconfidence also distort the Kalman gain. The distortion stemming
from overconfidence, however, is different. According to this theory, forecasters mis-
perceive the precision of their own signals. Suppose that forecasters observe only one
17I do not include a formal discussion of sticky information or linear noisy information models as
their shortcomings in this respect have already been documented in the literature. Appendix A.2
provides some detail on why these popular models are at odds with the data. In particular, they
imply error orthogonality at the forecaster-level.
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private signal:





i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2v),
but they perceive σ̃v < σv. Put another way, individual forecasters believe their own
private signals to be more precise than they truly are. This results in an erroneous
assessment of the noise in the system. Overconfident beliefs are recursive so that
the distorted gain injects a bias to the update in each period. These beliefs are
then projected forward only to be further distorted by the over-weighting of new
information in the subsequent period. In other words, at an arbitrary point in time,
forecasters exhibit both a non-zero ex-ante forecast error as well as a weighting error.
Models of overconfidence can generate individual overreactions as well as aggregate
underreactions, however, overconfidence is similarly unable to generate individual
underreactions.
Strategic interaction models can also generate error predictability. For instance,
strategic substitution can drive errors and revisions in opposite directions. This is
because forecasters have a dual objective of not only minimizing their errors but also
of distinguishing themselves from the average forecast. These models differ from the
previous two in that strategic interaction models are rational. While this class of
models can generate either overreaction or underreaction depending on the strategic
motive assumed, it is unable to jointly deliver β1 > 0 and β1 < 0.
Models of noisy memory, first introduced in Azeredo da Silvera and Woodford
(2019), can also generate overreactions. In a noisy memory model, forecasters do
not have access to their full history of signals due to finite memory capacity. While
models of rational inattention can explain individual underreactions, noisy memory
may explain individual overreactions. Developing a hybrid rational inattention-noisy
memory model could plausibly deliver simultaneous over- and underreactions.
Several other theories of expectations formation have been found to be inconsistent
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with the data. For instance, models of reputational concerns imply smoothing which
can only generate underreaction. Moreover, asymmetric loss functions deliver coun-
terfactually biased expectations, whereas the data show that professional forecasts
are not unconditionally biased.
2.4 Stylized Model
To extract further insight as to how time-varying volatility can generate over- and
underreactions, I consider next a stylized model of noisy information and unobserved
volatility. I provide simulation results that describe the source of over- and under-
reactions. In the subsequent section I document cross-sectional evidence consistent
with this mechanism.
2.4.1 Set Up
For simplicity, I suppose that forecasters can choose between two models: a Kalman
filter (KF) and a particle filter (PF). Forecasters utilizing KF ignore the stochastic
volatility and assess only the unconditional volatility of the state when formulating
predictions. By ignoring time-varying volatility, forecasts based on the Kalman filter
are suboptimal and generate error predictability among forecasters.
To reiterate, the Kalman gain is increasing in the signal-to-noise ratio, as illus-
trated in Figure 2·2. In a world with stochastic volatility, the optimal weight placed
on new information varies over time. If the nature of the volatility were known in
each period, then forecasters could update their predictions efficiently according to
the weights traced out by the curve. If one were to ignore the time-varying volatility
and filter with only the unconditional variance of the state, then he would update
according to the constant Kalman gain akin to the horizontal line in the figure.
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The underlying state in the stylized model is described as follows:
st = ρst−1 + e
ht/2wt, wt ∼ N (0, 1) (2.7)
ht = φ0 + φ1ht−1 + σηηt, ηt ∼ N (0, 1).
Furthermore, forecasters observe a contemporaneous private signal as well as a
lagged public signal18





i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1) (2.8)
xt−1 = st−1 + σeet−1, et−1 ∼ N (0, 1).
In addition to being unable to observe st, forecasters are also unable to observe





denote the vector of signals observed by forecasters.
Each period consists of two stages. In the first stage, a forecaster observes zit and
selects an approximation function. The use of these models comes at a random cost,
ci ∼ U(0, c) such that the PF cost distribution has a higher upper bound relative
to KF. Then in the second stage, given the predictor function and the history of
signals Z it , the forecaster reports a prediction of the public signal x̂it|t which is the
macroeconomic variable in question.1920 For simplicity, I normalize cKF = 0. With









, ciPF ∼ U(0, cPF ).
18One can alternatively envision that forecasters observe a macroeconomic variable with a transi-
tory (et) and persistent (st) component. The persistent component is what is relevant for forecasting
the target variable, though it is unobserved.
19The public signal in the model, x, maps to the SPF variable to be forecasted. The latent state,
st, on the other hand, is unobserved to the forecaster and the econometrician.
20At t, forecasters make use of their full history of signals in order to formulate a state estimate,
ŝ
i
t|t. The first element of the forecasted state vector is ŝ
i
t|t. Based on the assumption that xt = st+et,




A forecaster will choose to make use of the more sophisticated PF if and only if
MSEiKF −MSEiPF ≥ ciPF . (2.9)
The lefthand side of the inequality reflects the benefit to adopting the PF, which
manifests itself in a lower mean square error, whereas the righthand side denotes the
relative cost to adopting the PF. The adoption cost embodies unobserved hetero-
geneity in model adoption. As previously described, these reduced form costs can
reflect heterogeneous time constraints among professional forecasters, different levels
of training or experience in forecasting techniques, institution-specific frictions that
make it more difficult to adopt a particular forecasting model, etc.
Fundamentally, this is a noisy information environment in which forecasters infer
the state subject to private and public signals. Therefore, as in the simple model
described in the previous section, the sign of the covariance between errors and re-
visions depends on the underlying signal-to-noise ratio. As the signal-to-noise ratio
falls, forecast revisions are increasingly driven by the noise in the system. In this case,
it is as if forecasters report their predictions with measurement error since an upward
revision in the reported forecast will mechanically result in a more negative forecast
error. On the other hand, when the signal-to-noise ratio is high, then fluctuations
in the underlying state drive the forecast revisions. As a result, an upward revision
delivers a more positive forecast error.
2.4.2 Simulation Results
The simulation results reported in Table 2.3 confirm that the model is able to qual-
itatively explain over- and underreactions across level of aggregation and variable.
Differences across level of aggregation are seen through differences in simulated in-
dividual errors-on-revisions coefficient (β1) and its consensus analog (α1). Moreover,
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Table 2.3: Signal-to-Noise Ratio and Implied OLS Coefficients
Individual Aggregate SNR β1 α1
Underreaction Underreaction 1.40 0.12 0.46
Overreaction Underreaction 0.40 -0.14 0.18
Notes: The table simulates the errors-on-revision coefficient at the forecaster-level (β1) and the
consensus-level (α1) for two different simulated signal-to-noise ratios (SNR).
consider the difference in parameter values between models of individual underreac-
tions and models of individual overreactions. As the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is
reduced from 1.40 to 0.40, the sign of β1 changes.
21 This result suggests that ob-
served over- and underreactions at the individual level can be explained by different
underlying data generating processes.
I also plot the simulated β1 distribution across high signal-to-noise ratio and low
signal-to-noise ratio parameterizations. For each of 2,000 simulations, I generate a
panel of 250 forecasters over 200 periods. I then collect the errors and revisions
for these forecasters and compute β1. Figure 2·3 plots the density of β1 across the
simulations. The results confirm that the model can generate error predictability, and
that over- and underreactions depend on the signal-to-noise ratio.22
I next turn to the SPF data to document facts consistent with this mechanism.
2.5 Evidence from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
This section exploits variation across the macroeconomic variables reported in the
SPF in order to document evidence consistent with the idea that the signal-to-noise
21Although robust and reliable estimates of the SNR are currently sparse in this literature, CG
provide some estimates using cross-country data which are in line with the simulated SNR values
here. In addition, these simulated SNR values are similar to those that I quantify in Section 2.6.
22If all forecasters made use of the particle filter, however, then in large samples we would expect
this distribution to be centered at zero.
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Figure 2·3: Overreactions, Underreactions, and Driving Process
Notes: The figure plots two simulated densities of β1 arising from a pooled individual-level errors-
on-revisions regression from the stylized model. The red dashed line plots the simulation in which
private signal noise variance is relatively high whereas the solid blue line plots the simulation in
which private signal noise variance is relatively low.
ratio is the key driver of over- and underreactions. The next section will parame-
terize the model in order to speak to simultaneous over- and underreactions within
forecaster.
Each of the variables is presumed to follow a specific data generating process. As
a result, β1 = β1(ρ, σv, σe, φ0, φ1, ση) will, in general, vary in the cross-section of SPF
variables. I document four facts by measuring proxies for signal and noise. I find that
variables exhibiting greater unconditional volatility tend to be variables for which we
observe underreactions. On the other hand, variables that feature elevated amounts
of noise are associated with observed overreactions.
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Estimated private signal noise dispersion (σv)
Notes: For each SPF variable, the figure plots the estimated errors-on-revisions coefficient at the
forecaster-level against estimated private noise dispersion, proxied by the interquartile range of
forecast revisions. Slope of fitted line is −0.045.
Testable Prediction 1: Error Predictability and Private Noise
In the stylized model, forecasters revise their predictions according to the realization
of the lagged public signal as well as their contemporaneous private signal. The noise
therefore feeds into the forecast revision. From the perspective of the model, the vari-
ance of private signal noise determines the amount of dispersion in revisions across
forecasters. More dispersed signal noise admits more pronounced cross-sectional dif-
ferences in revisions.
With this insight, I collect the pooled β1 coefficients across SPF variables and plot
these against the interquartile range of revisions across forecasters for each variable.
Figure 2·4 displays the results. As the model suggests, variables exhibiting greater
dispersion in revisions tend to be those for which forecasters overreact.
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Testable Implication 2: Error Predictability and Public Noise
While Figure 2·4 relates β1 to private signal noise, there is also common noise present
in the model. I next turn to measure the noisiness of the public signal. Whereas
the SPF variable of interest has sometimes been modeled as the latent state in the
literature, it is best thought of as a lagged public signal. This is because the SPF
variables are observed by all forecasters with a lag. With this in mind, the official
government revisions made to these variables across different vintages can provide a
partial measure of public signal noise. Assuming that the vintages following the initial
real-time release of the variable eliminate some of the common noise, one can quantify
these revisions over time. As a matter of notation, define xIt as the real-time initial
data release for a given variable, and xLt as the last release of the variable. Then, we
can define noisepublict = Var(x
I
t − xLt ). I construct this variable from the first and last
data vintage for all SPF variables in my sample, and then measure the dispersion of
this public noise over time. Figure 2·5 relates β1 with this measure of public signal
noise. The results are consistent with the intuition of the model: variables exhibiting
higher measured noise dispersion tend to deliver observed overreactions.
Testable Prediction 3: Error Predictability and Unconditional Volatility
Moreover, the model predicts that with more unconditional variability in the state,
there is less scope for overreaction. To test this, I proceed to estimate {φj,0, φj,1} for







Figure 2·6 relates β1 to volj. The figure supports the hypothesis that variables ex-
hibiting more variability in the state tend to provide greater scope for underreactions.
23I estimate the parameters of the stochastic volatiliity model, {φ0, φ1, ση} using MCMC tech-
niques (Kastner & Frühwirth-Schnatter, 2014).
62














































0 2 4 6 8
Estimated public signal noise dispersion (σe)
Notes: For each SPF variable, the figure plots the estimated errors-on-revisions coefficient at the
forecaster-level against estimated public noise dispersion, proxied by the standard deviation of gov-
ernment revisions to real-time data. Slope of fitted line is −0.046.
Furthermore, note that the variance of the state is increasing in ρ. Hence, the model
predicts that more persistent variables will reduce the scope for overreactions. This
is consistent with Bordalo et al. (2020) who verify this empirically.
Testable Prediction 4: Error Predictability and Release Frequency
As an additional way to measure signal precision, I consider the frequency with which
these different variables are made available to the public. While professional forecast-
ers report predictions in each quarter, some variables are made available at higher
frequencies. Specifically, the SPF conducts its survey at roughly the middle of each
quarter. However, some of the SPF variables are released at a monthly frequency.
For instance employment statistics are released on the Friday of each month. The
survey asks forecasters to provide a quarterly average of these series. Furthermore,
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Estimated unconditional volatility
Notes: For each SPF variable, the figure plots the estimated errors-on-revisions coefficient at the






fitted line is 0.100.
the financial time series are available at a daily frequency. As a result, forecasters
have arguably more information pertaining to the eventual value of some variables
in a given quarter than others. This reduces the effective noise in the lagged public
signal.24 Hence, variables available at higher frequencies should raise the scope for
underreaction. Note that this does not preclude overreactive behavior in financial
markets as has been readily documented. Here, I simply argue that quarterly (aver-
age of daily observations) predictions of a financial variable are better informed by the
presence of daily observations through the middle of the quarter when the reported
forecast is requested. On the other hand, the latest information that forecasters have
for quarterly variables, such as GDP, is the previous quarter’s release and an advance
24Alternatively, one could suppose that forecasters receive an additional informative public signal
for daily or monthly SPF variables.
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Notes: For each SPF variable, the figure plots the estimated errors-on-revisions coefficient at the
forecaster-level against variable’s release frequency {Daily,Monthly,Quarterly}.
estimate. Since there is additional information available for some variables and not
others, and the existence of this additional information depends on the variable fre-
quency, then it follows that there is more scope for underreaction among variables
that are available at higher frequencies. Figure 2·7 confirms this.
Jointly Testing for Overreaction and Underreaction Channels
As an additional check, I formally test for these channels jointly. For the data to
accord with this theory of expectations, it should be the case that an interaction of
the forecast revision with each of these variables either raises or reduces the extent to
which β1 is negative in the pooled specification (column 1 of Table 2.1). To complete
this exercise, I incorporate two new regressors (and all possible interactions), each
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capturing a source of either noise or state volatility. As a measure of noise, I select the
release frequency explained above. For my measure of fundamental volatility, I take a
factor analysis approach. Since the latent state and its volatility are unobservable, it
is natural to consider an index of the shared variation among all SPF variables. From
this exercise, I obtain a time-varying index of what I call fundamental volatility.25
Given these two new regressors, I modify the baseline errors-on-revisions regres-
sion (pooling across all SPF variables as in Table 2.1). Specifically, in addition to
projecting errors on revisions, I specify a quarterly release indicator and the con-
structed fundamental volatility index. I also include interactions of each of these
with the forecast revision as well as all interactions with each other. The regression
results are reported in Table 2.4.
The first column of the table reproduces the first column of Table 2.1 for the
relevant observations. The second column reports the fully specified regression. The
relationship of interest remains the extent to which the forecast error and revision
are related. The only interaction terms to enter statistically significantly are those
crossed with the forecast revision. Furthermore, the signs of these two interactions are
consistent with the expected signs according to my theory of expectations under un-
observed time-varying volatility. In particular, noise raises the scope for overreactions
as evidenced by the negative cross term between the quarterly frequency indicator
and the revision. On the other hand, fundamental volatility reduces the scope for
overreaction as seen by the positive coefficients in front the volatility index and the
25For this analysis, I drop nominal GDP since its components reside in my data set. Furthermore,
I exclude CPI due to its shorter available history. For the remaining macroeconomic variables, I
compute five-year rolling standard deviations and then estimate underlying principal factors. The
results deliver two factors that explain roughly equal amounts of the common variance of the final
vintage of SPF variables. Based on the factor loadings, I call the first factor a real residential factor,
and the second a real non-residential factor (the residential factor loads highly on housing and real
residential investment whereas the second factor does not). While both factors deliver the correct
sign in my regression specification, I report the regression that specifies the real non-residential factor
as it delivers statistically detectable results. Appendix A.2 confirms that the results are robust to
window length.
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Revision × Quarterly -0.194**
(0.089)
Revision × Fundamental Volatility 0.106**
(0.041)
Observations 58,740 58,740
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients of forecast error predictability across two specifica-
tions. The Quarterly indicator is equal to 1 if the SPF variable is released at a quarterly frequency
and 0 otherwise. The Fundamental Volatility variable is a time-varying index constructed as de-
scribed in the text. In addition to the interactions reported in the table, the column (2) specification
includes the individual variables and their interactions as controls. Standard errors are as in Driscoll
and Kraay (1998). Data used for estimation come from SPF (1964Q4-2018Q3). *** denotes 1%
significance, ** denotes 5% significance, and * denotes 10% significance.
revision.
The cross-sectional correlations and regression results reported above confirm that
the model mechanism is consistent with the SPF. In the next section, I parameterize
the model in order to show that it is also consistent with the extent to which a
forecaster simultaneously over- and underreacts to different variables as in the data.
2.6 Parameterization
The model is able to generate over- and underreactions across levels of aggregation
and across variables, pooling over forecasters. In this section, I parameterize the
stylized model for real GDP and unemployment in order to demonstrate that it can
also generate simultaneous over- and underreactions within forecaster.
Specifically, I calibrate the public noise dispersion, the persistence of the latent
state, and the stochastic volatility parameters {σe, ρ, φ0, φ1, ση}. I then find the values
of cPF and σv that minimize the distance between the model-simulated and empirical
67
estimates of the errors-on-revisions coefficients at the forecaster and consensus-levels
(β1 and α1).
For real GDP and unemployment respectively, I set σe equal to the standard
deviation of the data revisions made to each variable over the sample period. The
data revision is taken to be the difference between the first and final release of the
data series. For the remaining parameters, I consider the revised data rather than
the real-time data. Intuitively, these series should be more highly correlated with
the unobserved latent state. I then estimate an AR(1) on the revised series and set
ρ equal to the estimated AR(1) coefficient. Finally, I collect the squared residuals
from this autoregression and estimate {φ0, φ1, ση}. Panel A of Table 2.5 reports the
calibration for each variable.
I then parameterize σv and cPF by minimizing the distance between the model-
implied {β1, α1} from its empirical counterpart. Since I am calibrating these pa-
rameters for GDP and unemployment, the procedure amounts to searching a four-
dimensional parameter space and matching four moments. For each simulation, I
generate two state variables according to the dynamics described in Section 2.4. I
then simulate the lagged public signal as well as the contemporaneous private sig-
nal for each variable. In every period, forecasters report a forecast for each variable
according to the state dynamics, signals received, and loss function described in Sec-
tion 2.5. From this simulated panel of forecasters, I construct the errors-on-revisions
coefficients. I minimize the distance between the simulated and empirical OLS coeffi-
cients by making use of simulated annealing, a standard global stochastic optimization
routine.
The results, reported in Panel B of Table 2.5, indicate that real GDP is charac-
terized by more private signal noise than the unemployment rate. Furthermore, as




Parameter Description Unemployment Real GDP
ρ State persistence 0.98 0.30
σe Standard deviation of public noise 0.07 2.02
φ0 Level of log variance -0.76 0.14
φ1 Persistence of log variance 0.73 0.92
ση Volatility of log variance 0.69 0.39
Panel B: Internal
Parameter Description Unemployment Real GDP
σv Standard deviation of private noise 0.12 2.81
cPF PF cost upper bound 7.84 3.79
Panel C: Implied values
Description Unemployment Real GDP
Signal-to-noise ratio 1.36 0.50
Share using PF 0.53 0.82
Notes: The table reports parameterization for unemployment and real GDP. Panel A reports the
external parameterization. The stochastic volatility parameters {φ0, φ1, ση} are estimated according
to the algorithm presented in Kastner and Frühwirth-Schnatter (2014). Panel B reports internal
parameterization obtain through the minimum distance procedure described in the text. Based on
this calibration, Panel C reports the implied signal-to-noise ratio and share of forecasters that utilize
the PF model.
it is 1.36 for unemployment. This is consistent with the intuition of the model as well
as the cross-sectional evidence in the previous section: variables that exhibit higher
signal-to-noise ratios tend to be the variables for which underreactions are observed.
In addition, the cost distribution parameters indicate that costs to implementing
the particle filter for real GDP are lower on average relative to the unemployment
rate. The discrepancy between these two cost parameters can be attributed to the
fact that mean square errors in the data are much larger in magnitude for real GDP.
These costs govern in part the incentives to adopt the particle filter and, as reported
in Panel C, imply that roughly 82% of forecasters optimally select to forecast with
the particle filter for real GDP. On the other hand, 53% of forecasters choose the
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Table 2.6: Model Fit
Model Data
Unemployment
Errors-on-revisions, forecaster-level (β1) 0.149 0.082
Errors-on-revisions, consensus (α1) 0.212 0.247
Real GDP
Errors-on-revisions, forecaster-level (β1) -0.263 -0.264
Errors-on-revisions, consensus (α1) 0.352 0.350
Notes: The table reports empirical and model-implied moments. The calibration directly targets
the errors-on-revisions moments for unemployment and real GDP at the forecaster and consensus-
levels. The final row reports the share of forecasters that overreact to real GDP and simultaneously
underreact to unemployment.
particle filter as the forecasting model of choice for unemployment.
Table 2.6 reports the model fit. The minimum distance procedure was able to suc-
cessfully match patterns of over- and underreactions observed in the pooled forecaster-
level and consensus regressions for real GDP. Though the fit for unemployment is not
as tight, the model can fairly closely match the consensus-level coefficient and can
qualitatively match the forecaster-level coefficient.
Lastly, I assess the calibrated model’s ability to match untargeted moments. Ta-
ble 2.7 reports the mean square error, standard deviation of errors, and the share of
over- and underreaction. Although the model generally overstates the mean square
error, it successfully matches the relative magnitudes across both variables. Further-
more, the model is broadly successful in matching the dispersion of forecast errors.
Lastly, the stylized model is able to successfully match the share of simultaneous over-
and underreactions. Figure 2·1 reports that about 64% of forecasters in the sample
overreact to real GDP while simultaneously underreacting to unemployment. Based
on the parameterization devised here, the stylized model 63% of simulated forecasters
overreact real GDP and underreact to unemployment.
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Standard deviation of forecast error
Model 0.320 2.670
Data 0.209 2.451
Share that overreact to real GDP
and underreact to unemployment
Model 0.632
Data 0.641
Notes: The table reports empirical and model-implied moments. The calibration directly targets
the errors-on-revisions moments for unemployment and real GDP at the forecaster and consensus-
levels. The final row reports the share of forecasters that overreact to real GDP and simultaneously
underreact to unemployment.
2.6.1 Implications for Information Rigidities
What does time-varying volatility coupled with noisy information imply about in-
terpreting the coefficient α1 as an information rigidity? Based on my model, it is
apparent that α1 does not cleanly map to the Kalman gain as it does in the scalar
linear context.26 The key intuition of Bayesian filtering, however, still holds, and the
optimal weight placed on innovation errors remains a sufficient statistic for capturing
the rate of learning. This weight depends on the covariances of the state estimation
error and the measurement error. Quantifying the rate of learning, however, is not
readily feasible from a projection of mean errors on mean revisions as has traditionally
been suggested in the literature (An, Liu, & Wu, 2021; Coibion & Gorodnichenko,
2015; Dovern et al., 2015; Larsen, Thorsrud, & Zhulanova, 2020).
26See Appendix A.2.
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In fact, from the perspective of the stylized model, the coefficient coming from
errors on revisions regressions at the consensus-level may reveal misleading insights
on the extent of information rigidity. Whereas a large α1 coefficient would typically
imply more information rigidities, here, α1 is larger when the signal-to-noise ratio is
high. On the other hand, a negative α1 arises when signals are less informative. This
suggests that the reduced form coefficient α1 may be limited in what it reveals about
genuine information frictions.
2.6.2 Implications for State Dependence
What does this mean for state dependence? If β1 and α1 were to rise in recessions,
then the model would imply that the signal to noise ratio is countercyclical and in-
formation rigidities fall during economic downturns. If, on the other hand, these
coefficients fall, then the signal-to-noise ratio is procyclical and information rigidities
actually rise in recessions. CG document evidence indicating that α1 falls in reces-
sions. They interpret this as a reduction in information rigidities, however, my model
would suggest that this implies a rise in information rigidities since it implies that
the system experiences elevated amounts of noise. This is an important distinction
between my model and the extant literature as it delivers an opposite answer to the
question of whether individuals trust their signal more or less in recessions.
However, after performing a similar exercise to that in Table 2.4 by interacting a
quarterly recession indicator with forecast revisions, I find no evidence that β1 or α1
changes with the business cycle. I also run this exercise by replacing the recession
indicator with revised real GDP growth. It is possible, however, that the signal-to-
noise ratio is insensitive to business cycle fluctuations because both the state and
the signal experience stochastic volatility. I abstract away from volatility in signal
precision, so there is a limit as to what one could glean from this model as it pertains
to state dependence of information rigidities.
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Nonetheless, one could distinguish between two types of uncertainty: fundamental
uncertainty and information uncertainty. The first maps to time-varying volatility in
the state while the latter arises when signal noise experiences stochastic volatility.
There is a literature that stresses the importance of uncertainty shocks. These are
often modeled as fundamental uncertainty shocks. Shocks to information precision
are also studied in the literature (Dun Jia, 2016). According to my model, the state
dependence of β1 and α1 depend on the signal-to-noise ratio which in turn depends on
how these two types of uncertainty evolve relative to one another over the business
cycle. If both rise in recessions, then is possible that the signal-to-noise ratio is
acyclical thereby rendering β1 and α1 roughly constant over the cycle as well.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper documents that individual forecasters appear to simultaneous over- and
underreact to new information. Existing models of belief formation are unable to
flexibly accommodate these empirical patterns. This paper shows that a noisy in-
formation model incorporating unobserved time-varying volatility can make sense of
these facts. Forecasters optimally select different models based on the complexity of
the state dynamics. Heterogeneity in predictor functions can jointly deliver coinci-
dent over- and underreactions among forecasters. In particular, forecasters overreact
to variables that exhibit more noise whereas they underreact to variables that are
characterized by less noise. I uncover evidence in favor of this mechanism, demon-
strating that fluctuations in volatility matter for belief dynamics.
73
Chapter 3
A New Fact to Discipline Models of
Beliefs
3.1 Introduction
Expectations are ubiquitous in economics. Nonetheless, the manner in which expecta-
tions are formed remains an open question. The benchmark theory of full information
rational expectations (FIRE) posits that agents form beliefs in an optimal manner
such that ex-post forecast errors are unpredictable. Error orthogonality, however, has
been found to be inconsistent with survey data on individual expectations. In par-
ticular, ex-ante updates made to forecasts are systematically correlated with ex-post
errors. Such error predictability has motivated departures from FIRE in the litera-
ture, particularly in favor of non-rational theories (Bordalo et al., 2020; Broer &
Kohlhas, 2019; D’Acunto, Hoang, Paloviita, & Weber, 2019; Kohlhas & Walther,
2020).
This paper shows that error predictability, while sufficient to reject FIRE, is not
particularly informative about individual rationality. I show this by way of example.
Specifically, I narrow my focus to models that explain overreaction, a salient feature of
survey data. I consider three prominent non-FIRE theories, embedded in a noisy in-
formation environment: overconfidence (Daniel et al., 1998), diagnostic expectations
(Bordalo et al., 2020), and strategic interaction (Woodford, 2001). I then prove
that all three of these models can deliver identical patterns of error predictability.
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Whereas the first two models feature non-rational expectations, the model of strate-
gic interaction is rational. Intuitively, each of these theories features a key parameter
that governs the extent of overreactive behavior. I show that the key parameters can
be mapped to each other, thereby delivering identical relationships between ex-post
expectation errors and ex-ante revisions.
The three candidate models, however, are not observationally equivalent in gen-
eral. I offer a simple testable implication that is able to distinguish across all three
of these models, and that can provide a way forward more broadly as the litera-
ture assesses which non-FIRE theories are consistent with the data. The relevant
testable implication is the serial correlation of revisions. Models of overconfidence
imply a negative autocorrelation coefficient for revisions, distinct from the aforemen-
tioned errors-on-revisions coefficient. Whereas diagnostic expectations also deliver a
negative autocorrelation coefficient for revisions, this theory implies that the auto-
correlation of revisions is identical to the errors-on-revisions coefficient. On the other
hand, the model of strategic interactions requires that revisions made to a fixed event
forecast be unpredictable.
When taking this testable implication to data from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF), I document evidence in against models of strategic interaction.
For most variables in the SPF, I find that estimates of error predictability and revision
persistence are not statistically distinct from one another. As a result, of the three
models considered, the data favor diagnostic expectations. Nonetheless, there are
some variables for which these estimates diverge significantly, indicating that a theory
of overconfidence provides a better fit for those variables.
My findings support non-rational theories of overreaction under standard lin-
ear dynamics.1 Whereas models featuring Bayesian updating can deliver error pre-
dictability conditional on modifications made to the forecaster’s objective, these mod-
1Models featuring nonlinear dynamics have also been found to rationalize the data (Ortiz, 2020).
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els are generally unable to deliver revision predictability.2 Bayesian updating requires
that information be used efficiently, thereby preventing past revisions from holding
predictive power over current revisions. Hence, analyzing the time series properties
of revisions serves as a way to narrow the set of non-FIRE models that are consistent
with the data.
Several studies have used survey data to test for FIRE.3 In essence, FIRE implies
that expectation errors, et, are orthogonal to the individual forecaster’s information
set, It:
E(et|It) = 0.
This implication, however, is at odds with the data. In particular, ex-ante fore-
cast revisions predict ex-post errors. Since a rejection of FIRE can be due to either a
rejection of full information or a rejection of rationality, existing non-FIRE theories
can be classified as fundamentally rational or non-rational. Rational non-FIRE theo-
ries typically incorporate a particular motive for deviating from the minimum mean
square forecast. On the other hand, non-rational theories introduce a behavioral bias.
In either case, expectation errors can be characterized as:
Ê(et|It) 6= 0.
Nordhaus (1987) first introduced the testable implication proposed in this paper
which states that revisions are not serially correlated. This is an implication of the fact
that under FIRE, revisions rt, must be unpredictable conditioning on the forecaster’s
information set:
E(rt|It) = 0.
2There are two documented exceptions in the extant literature: models featuring smoothing
motives and noisy memory. Section 3.5 discusses these theories in more detail.
3Examples include Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015), Bordalo et al. (2020), Fuhrer (2018),
Dovern et al. (2015), Crowe (2010), Paloviita and Viren (2013), Bürgi (2016), Andrade and Bihan
(2013)
76
The key contribution of this paper is to study non-FIRE theories in which:
Êt(rt|It) = 0 despite Êt(et|It) 6= 0,
and to show that such theories are inconsistent with the data. Because serially corre-
lated revisions imply error predictability (but not the other way around), this paper
offers a stronger fact to discipline models of beliefs.
The focus of this paper is on overreaction. It should be noted that a recent
literature has documented the existence of both over- and underreaction in survey
expectations (Broer & Kohlhas, 2019; Kohlhas & Walther, 2020; Ortiz, 2020).
There is at present no unified definition of over- and underreaction. For instance
Broer and Kohlhas (2019) document overreaction in the form of a negative relation
between errors and revisions, and underreaction to some endogenous public signals.
On the other hand, Kohlhas and Walther (2020) define overreactions as a negative
relation between errors and current output growth, while underreactions are defined
as a the relation between errors and revisions at the consensus-level. Finally, Ortiz
(2020) documents that the same forecaster simultaneously exhibits positive and neg-
ative coefficients of error predictability for distinct macroeconomic variables. Though
I abstract from these empirical regularities here, my findings are relevant for this
strand of the literature as well. In particular, theories of simultaneous over- and
underreaction that are to be consistent with professional forecasts must be able to
deliver serially correlated revisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I document empirical
facts related to overreaction in survey expectations, based on both error and revision
predictability. In Section 3.3, I introduce the three candidate models of overreaction.
Section 3.4 maps the models’ key parameters to each other and shows that all models
can deliver the same relation between errors and revisions. I then characterize revision
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predictability from the lens of each model in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Evidence of Overreaction in Survey Expectations
Many non-FIRE theories have been devised to explain overreactive behavior (Afrouzi,
Kwon, Landier, Ma, & Thesmar, 2020; Benigno & Karantounias, 2019; Bordalo
et al., 2020; Fuster, Hebert, & Laibson, 2012b; Rozsypal & Schlafmann, 2019).
The literature often utilizes survey data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters in
order to assess the empirical performance of different theories. The SPF is a quarterly
survey provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The survey provides
forecasts from several forecasters across a number of macroeconomic variables over
many horizons.
A popular test often implemented for empirical motivation projects expectation
errors on revisions. Suppose that xt is the target variable and x
i
t+h|t is forecaster i’s
forecast devised at time t for horizon h. Then the empirical test is defined as:
xt+h − xit+h|t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Error
= β0 + β1[x
i
t+h|t − xit+h|t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revision
] + εit+h. (3.1)
At the forecaster-level, the coefficient in front of the revision is found to be negative
for a range of macroeconomic variables, β1.
4 Table 3.1 confirms this finding. Pooling
across horizons, the results indicate that errors covary negatively with revisions. For
instance, a one percentage point upward revision for real GDP is associated with a 0.23
percentage point more negative forecast error. Following positive news, forecasters
tend to revise upward excessively such that the overly-optimistic update results in a
systematically more negative subsequent error. Hence, professional forecasters tend
4Though there is also evidence of underreaction for some variables, I focus on overreaction due
to its pervasiveness at the forecaster-level. Moreover, the model comparison exercise that I later
undertake is without much loss of generality. In particular, a theory of underreaction that features
strategic complementarity would imply a positive covariance between errors and revisions, but it
would nonetheless require that revisions be serially uncorrelated.
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Table 3.1: Forecast Error Predictability
Variable Estimate Standard Error Observations
CPI -0.103 0.122 7,052
Industrial production -0.177 0.055 11,491
Nominal GDP -0.291 0.044 11,994
GDP deflator -0.297 0.057 11,951
Real consumption -0.373 0.072 8,865
Real federal government spending -0.499 0.061 8,273
Real GDP -0.229 0.058 12,110
Real nonresidential investment -0.228 0.088 8,604
Real residential investment -0.192 0.059 8,587
Real state and local government spending -0.542 0.027 8,282
Ten-year government bond -0.079 0.059 7,246
Notes: The table reports the estimated β1 coefficient of error predictability from (3.1). Samples for
reach regression are pooled across horizons. Standard errors are clustered by forecaster and quarter.
to over-revise their forecasts.
Overreaction can similarly be observed by analyzing the persistence of fixed-event
updates. Empirically, revision predictability estimates the following relationship:
xit+h|t − xit+h|t+h−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revision
= γ0 + γ1[x
i
t+h|t+h−1 − xit+h|t+h−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Previous revision
] + νit+h, (3.2)
If γ1 6= 0, then the fixed event revisions are serially correlated (predictable). Whereas
testing for error predictability is more common in the literature, revision predictability
was previously analyzed in Dovern et al. (2015).
Table 3.2 reports estimates of (3.2). Across the same set of variables for which
β1 < 0, there is also ample evidence of γ1 < 0. Focusing on real GDP, a one percentage
point upward revision in the forecast for t+h devised today is associated with a 0.23
percentage point downward revision in the same forecast made tomorrow. Jointly,
the results could be interpreted as follows: amid the realization of positive news
today, forecasters appear to over-revise their predictions upward only to observe a
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Table 3.2: Forecast Revision Predictability
Variable Estimate Standard Error Observations
CPI -0.250 0.064 7,052
Industrial production -0.202 0.030 11,491
Nominal GDP -0.223 0.032 11,994
GDP deflator -0.255 0.031 11,951
Real consumption -0.240 0.042 8,865
Real federal government spending -0.283 0.029 8,273
Real GDP -0.211 0.033 12,110
Real nonresidential investment -0.165 0.042 8,604
Real residential investment -0.165 0.039 8,587
Real state and local government spending -0.317 0.025 8,282
Ten-year government bond 0.003 0.052 7,246
Notes: The table reports the estimated β1 coefficient of error predictability from (3.2). Samples for
reach regression are pooled across horizons. Standard errors are clusted by forecaster and quarter.
systematically more negative forecast error tomorrow, which subsequently contributes
to a more pessimistic revision tomorrow.
Overreaction is pervasive among professional forecasters. In the subsequent sec-
tion, I review three prominent models of overreaction that have been proposed in the
literature.
3.3 Three Models of Overreactive Behavior
All three models of overreaction are grounded in a noisy information setting with
heterogeneous beliefs. Optimal forecasts in this context are consistent with the math-
ematical expectations operator, E. This will be the benchmark from which all other
expectations will deviate. In keeping with Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) and
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Bordalo et al. (2020) consider the following set up:
Exogenous State: xt = ρxt−1 + wt, wt ∼ N (0, σ2w)





i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2v).
The exogenous fundamental follows a simple AR(1) process.5 Moreover, agents have
access only to private information in the form of a noisy private signal yit observed
each period. I abstract away from more complex signal structures for simplicity,
however, the assumptions on how agents receive information are unimportant for the
results presented in subsequent sections.
From the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960), the optimal current-period prediction of
xt is:
E(xt|I it) ≡ xit|t = (1− κ)xit|t−1 + κyit,
where I it denotes individual i’s information set at time t, and κ refers to the
steady-state Kalman gain, κ =
Var(xt−xit|t−1)
Var(xt−xit|t−1)+σ2v
which is the optimal (in the mean-
square sense) weight placed on new information.6
3.3.1 Overconfidence
First, I consider a non-rational model of overconfidence. Daniel et al. (1998) presents a
theory of overconfidence in which individuals perceive their private signals to be more
precise than they truly are. Intuitively, because forecasters believe their information
to be more precise, they will tend to trust their signals more than is optimal. As
a result, overconfident forecasters over-weight new information, thereby generating a
over-revisions and delivering a negative covariance between updates and errors.
5The dynamics of the state are innocuous for the results of the paper.
6Note that the imperfect information enviornment is a more general formulation than a full-
information environment. The model collapses to full-information rational expectations when σv = 0
so that κ = 1.
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Specifically, forecasters perceive:





i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ̊2v)
where σ̊v = ασv such that α ∈ [0, 1].
As a matter of notation, let the forecaster’s current period forecast be denoted by
x̊it|t, and his one step ahead forecast by x̊
i
t|t−1. Forecasters invoke the Kalman filter
in order to formulate their expectations. As a result, expectations are determined








t − x̊it|t−1) (Update).
Having defined the expectations formation process under overconfidence, we ob-
tain the following result.
Proposition 1. The OLS coefficient arising from an errors-on-revisions regression
in the overconfidence model is:
βOC1 =




V(xt − x̊it|t−1) + σ2v
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The coefficient βOC1 is always negative since α < 1. In the absence of overconfi-
dence, α = 1 and β1 = 0. Hence, underlying overconfidence on the part of forecasters
generates observed overreaction.
3.3.2 Diagnostic Expectations
Second, I consider a non-rational theory of diagnostic expectations (Bordalo et al.,
2020). Under diagnostic expectations, overreactions arise due to the representative-
ness heuristic of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Intuitively, more recent information
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is more easily recalled and therefore overweighted when formulating beliefs. The








t|t − xit|t−1) (Update),
where θ is the belief distortion parameter that governs the extent of overreaction.
Under θ = 0, there is no belief distortion, and expectations collapse to the standard
rational expectations benchmark.
Bordalo et al. (2020) provide additional details including a derivation of the coef-
ficient of error predictability:
βDE1 =










(1 + θ)2 + θ2ρ2
< 0.
3.3.3 Strategic Interaction
Overreactions can also arise rationally, that is, as an optimal outcome. I next con-
sider a model of strategic interaction. The model presented in this section draws from
Morris and Shin (2002), Woodford (2001), and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015).
To obtain overreactions, I assume that forecasters are characterized by strategic sub-
stitutability. Intuitively, forecasters have the dual objective to minimize their squared
errors and also to distinguish themselves from the average forecast. More specifically,






(xt − x̃it|t)2 +R(x̃it|t − Ft)2|I it
]
. (3.3)
where xt is the realized fundamental, x̃
i
t|t is forecaster i’s reported current-period
forecast, I it is forecaster i’s information set at time t, Ft is the consensus forecast at
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time t, and R < 0 is the degree of strategic substitutability.7 There are a number
of possible microfoundations for strategic substitutability. Most prominently, see
Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006). When R = 0, the loss function collapses to the
familiar mean-squared loss.
The presence of strategic incentives makes higher order beliefs crucial to this


















where E(k) is the kth-order expectation of xt.









where xit|t is the optimal current-period forecast for the state and F
i
t|t is forecaster i’s
prediction about what the consensus nowcast is at time t.
From this, it follows that the forecast error in this model is:8











and the forecast revision is defined as:
x̃it|t − x̃it|t−1 = λ(xt − xit|t−1 + vit).
where λ = κ1+Rκ2
1+R
and κ1 and κ2 are the elements of the 2× 1 Kalman gain vector,
κ.9
7For R > 0, forecasters exhibit strategic complementarities. That is, forecasters have an incentive
to stay close to the consensus forecast.
8See Appendix A.3 for details.
9The Kalman gain vector is two-dimensional because forecasters generate predictions for the
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Having defined the errors and revisions according to this model, we can derive the
following result.






Proof. See Appendix A.3.
As expected, when R = 0, the coefficient βSI1 = 0, consistent with rational expec-
tations under standard mean squared loss. Given the assumption placed on R, this
model can generate overreactions.10
All three of these models are capable of explaining the over-revisions observed in
the survey data and reported in Table 3.1. Collectively, these three models encompass
both rational and non-rational theories of expectation formation. I next demonstrate
how these three models can deliver the same patterns of error predicability, implying
that the forecast error predictability, while evidence against FIRE, is not particularly
informative about rationality. Following this, I show how revision predictability is
a more desirable test because it can speak to deviations from FIRE and can deliver
sharper implications about rationality.
3.4 Matching Error Predictability
All three models discussed in the previous section are able to generate forecaster-level
overreactions. Table 3.3 summarizes the updating rules for each of the three models.
Note that these models can be expressed as a (positive) deviation from the conditional
unobserved state, xt and the unobserved consensus forecast, Ft.
10One might wonder whether forecasters can exhibit overreactions under strategic complemen-
tarities (R > 0). This can only occur if the weight placed private information when predicting
the consensus forecast exceeds the weight placed on private information when predicting the state
(κ2 > κ1). Given that the signal is more informative about xt than Ft, it is never optimal for the
forecaster to set κ2 > κ1.
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Table 3.3: Update Rules Across Models
Model Update rule
Overconfidence x̂it|t = x
i
t|t + (1− κ̂)x̂it|t−1 − (1− κ)xit|t−1 + (κ̂− κ)yit










(xit|t − F it|t)
Notes: The table reports the updating rules for models of overconfidence, diagnostic expectations,
and strategic interaction.
expectation, E(xt|I it) ≡ xit|t. Hence, forecast updates exceed what is called for by the
optimal minimum mean square estimate. Importantly, all three theories can deliver
an identical β1 coefficient.
Proposition 3. Fix the state and signal parameters, ρ, σw, and σv. Given one of the






Proof. See Appendix A.3.
This is fundamentally an exercise in matching moments. In light of the recent
use of β1 to motivate non-FIRE models, this result demonstrates that a key assump-
tion made in non-FIRE models (rationality or non-rationality) are equally capable of
delivering the same patterns of error predictability. I next summarize precisely how
these coefficients are equalized across theories of overreaction with details provided
in Appendix A.3.
Consider first the mapping to the strategic interaction model. Given βDE1 =
β1(ρ, σv, σw, θ) or β
OC
1 = β1(ρ, σv, σw, α), we can match β1 in the strategic interaction
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model by setting the degree of strategic substitution to be:
R =
[κ1(1 + θ)− κ2](1 + θ) + (κ1 − κ2)ρ2θ2




(κ1 − κ2)[V(xt − x̊it|t−1) + σ2v ]− (α2 − 1)σ2vκ2
,
respectively.









w, α), one could construct a model diagnostic expectations that



















V(xt − x̊it|t−1) + σ2v
+
(V(xt − x̊it|t−1) + (2α2 − 1)σ2v




(V(xt − x̊it|t−1) + [α2 + ρ2(α2 − 1)]σ2v













w, R) one could construct a model of overconfidence by finding the
α parameter such that:
α =
√
(1 + θ)[σ2v − θV(xt − x̊it|t−1)]








Hence, by simply assessing the regression coefficient in an errors-on-revisions re-
11Note that V(xt − x̊it|t−1) ≡ Ψ̊
i
t|t−1(α) is the forecast error variance in the overconfidence model
which is itself a function of α.
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gression, one cannot necessarily distinguish across noisy information models of ra-
tional and non-rational expectations. The panels in Figure 3·1 plot the relationship
between the θ, α, and R that are key in delivering identical β1 coefficients.
Figure 3·1: Mapping β1 Across Models of Overreactions
Notes: The figure plots the degree of strategic substitutability, R, that generates the same β1
that is obtained by non-rational models of overreactions denoted by the degree of diagnosticity, θ




While both models can deliver identical β1 coefficients, they are not observationally
equivalent, in general. Hence, with enough data, one can discern between the two.
More broadly, with enough data, we can distinguish between two subsets of non-FIRE
models. I show that we can make progress on this front by merely focusing on an
additional fact: the persistence of fixed-event revisions.
Beyond forecast error orthogonality, Nordhaus (1987) notes that revisions must
be “informationally efficient.” This requires the following condition to hold:
E(xit|t − xit|t−1|I it) = 0.
In words, forecast revisions must be orthogonal to any variable residing in the fore-
casters information set,
E[(xit|t − xit|t−1)µ] = 0 for µ ∈ I it .
This is akin to the error orthogonality condition which has been the focus of conven-
tional efficiency tests. However, whereas error orthogonality can be violated for some
linear noisy information rational expectations models, revision orthogonality cannot.
This is an artifact of Bayesian updating in a linear setting. In such models, the fore-
cast revision is equal to the innovation error observed when the signal is received,
scaled by the optimal Kalman gain. These innovation errors are unpredictable by
definition. Motivated by this insight, I present the next result.
Proposition 4. The three models deliver distinct implications about the serial corre-
lation of revisions. In particular:









(iii) The strategic interaction model implies: γ1 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The autocorrelation of revisions is able to distinguish between all three models.
In particular, the overconfidence model implies that revision persistence is negative
and distinct from the errors-on-revisions coefficient. On the other hand, diagnostic
expectations models imply that the persistence of revisions is identical to the errors-
on-revisions coefficient. Finally, the strategic interaction model requires that revisions
be serially uncorrelated.
Figure 3·2 plots a set of simulations results from all three models. I first fix the
parameters of the strategic interaction model and I find the {α, θ} that replicate βSI1
in the other two models. I then compute the simulated revision persistence coefficient,
γ1 for the three models. The figure verifies that while all models can share identical β1
coefficients, they have distinct implications for revision persistence. Consistent with
Proposition 4, the overconfidence model implies that the first-order autocorrelation
of revisions is smaller than the error predictability coefficient. Furthermore, diag-
nostic expectations requires that these two coefficients be equal. Finally, strategic
interaction model requires lagged revisions to have no predictive power over current
revisions. Observed overreaction on the basis of errors-on-revisions regressions is
consistent with several theories, rational and non-rational alike. However, revision
persistence is capable of discerning across non-FIRE models, and in the process, is
more information about rationality. Based on negatively serially correlated revisions
in the data, a rational model of strategic diversification can be rejected.
3.5.1 Empirical Evidence Against Strategic Interaction
Based on Table 3.2, it is clear that the data are inconsistent with serially uncorrelated
revisions. Furthermore, Figure C1 visualizes the 95% confidence intervals of the error
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Figure 3·2: Simulated First-Order Autocorrelation of Revisions
Notes: The figure plots the simulated γ1 coefficients from the three models, each of which delivers
the same simulated β1 coefficient of -0.37. The mean first-order autocorrelations of revisions are:
-0.009, -0.11, and -0.37 for the strategic interaction, overconfidence, and diagnostic expectations
models, respectively.
predictability estimates alongside revision persistence.12 The estimates of β1 and γ1
are mostly statistically indistinguishable from one another. This lends support to
the of overreaction based on diagnostic expectations. Nonetheless, for some variables
there is evidence that the error predictability coefficient is different from the auto-
correlation of revisions, namely, for macroeconomic variables related to government
spending. In these cases, the data support a model of overconfidence.
12Estimates are pooled across horizon. Appendix A.3 details horizon-by-horizon results.
91





















CPI IP NGDP PGDP RCON RFED RGDP RNIN RRIN RSL TBOND
Variable
Beta Gamma
Notes: Figure displays 95% confidence intervals for estimated coefficients of error predictability and
revision persistence, (β1 and γ1 in the main text, respectively). Double clustered standard errors are
specified. EMP- Employment, IP - Industrial Production, NGDP - Nominal GDP, PGDP - GDP
Deflator, RCON - Real Consumption, RFED - Real Federal Government Spending, RGDP - Real
GDP, RNIN - Real Nonresidential Investment, RRIN - Real Residential Investment, and RSL - Real
State and Local Government Spending.
3.5.2 Broader Implications of Revision Predictability
As demonstrated in Table 3.3, non-FIRE forecasts can be generally expressed as some
deviation from the conditional expectation:
xit|t = E(xt|It) + τ it|t
xit|t−1 = E(xt|It−1) + τ it|t−1,
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where τ it|t and τ
i
t|t−1 describe the nature of the deviation from the minimum mean
square forecast.13 These deviations, which are either due to a strategic motive or a
behavioral bias, can generate error predictability. However, models featuring strategic
motives (i.e. alterations to the standard mean square error objective) tend to imply
zero autocovariance of revisions, implying:
Cov(τ it|t − τ it|t−1, τ it|t−1 − τ it|t−2) = 0.
Examples of such models include those incorporating strategic interaction, heteroge-
neous priors, and asymmetric attention.14
Notably, models featuring smoothing motives (Scotese, 1994) and noisy memory
(Afrouzi et al., 2020; Azeredo da Silvera & Woodford, 2019) are an exception to
this condition. In the case of smoothing motives, the forecast revision is explicitly
incorporated in the forecaster’s objective. As a result, the optimal reported forecast
is a linear combination of the conditional expectation and the forecast revision. The
canonical model featuring smoothing motives will imply a counterfactually positive
autocorrelation of revisions. Nonetheless, as shown in Appendix A.3, a model of multi-
horizon forecasts and a smoothing motive with respect to the long term forecast, can
generate negatively serially correlated revisions.
Moreover, models featuring noisy memory can successfully deliver serially corre-
lated revisions because forecasters optimize over the set of past signal realizations.15
In particular, forecasters face a cost to retrieve past information. Intuitively, the
presence of such a cost allows for information sets across adjacent periods to differ,
thereby admitting serially correlated revisions. These two theories serve as exceptions
13The benchmark noisy information model is a special case where τ it|t = τ
i
t|t−1 = 0.
14See Appendix A.3 for a discussion of alternative models.
15Such models imply that the scope for serially correlated revisions is decreasing in the under-
lying persistence of the variable in question. In particular, when ρ = 1, these models imply zero
autocorrelation of revisions.
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since they are both rational models that are able to generate non-zero revision per-
sistence. Finding ways to further discern between these models and those featuring
non-rational expectations can be a promising area of future research (see, for instance
D’Haultfoeuielle, Gaillac, and Maruel (2020)).
In general, theories that invoke Bayesian updating require informational efficiency
despite the modified incentives to optimally deviate from the conditional expectation.
Besides models in which forecasters strategically track their path of revisions or op-
timally choose their information sets each period, these models preclude revisions
from being serially correlated. The class of models featuring behavioral biases, on the
other hand, are generally better able to produce persistence in fixed-event revisions.
Besides the overconfidence and diagnostic expectations models considered here, other
theories that can make sense of this empirical fact include, for instance, models of
relative overconfidence (Broer & Kohlhas, 2019) and natural expectations (Fuster,
Laibson, & Mendel, 2010).
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that the popular errors-on-revisions coefficient used in the ex-
pectations formation literature is insufficient to motivate departures from rationality.
By way of example, I demonstrate that two prominent models of non-rational expec-
tations can deliver the same errors-on-revisions coefficient as in a rational strategic
interaction model. Motivated by this finding, I offer a new fact for further discern-
ing across non-FIRE models which requires projecting revisions on their past values.
Using data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, I find evidence favoring diag-
nostic expectations and overconfidence over strategic interaction. To make progress
on understanding how different economic actors formulate their expectations, it is
necessary to have a rich set of theories. Conditional on a set of existing theories,
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however, it is important to assess the ways in which the models the fit the data.
Studying the time series properties of updates made to fixed-event forecasts serves as




A.1 Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1.1 Empirics
This section provides summary statistics of the data used in Section 2 of the main
text. The section also includes further details on the JIT adopters data obtained, the
weather regression results, and industry-level results.
Sample Construction
Table A1: Compustat Summary Statistics
Mean Median Standard Deviation 25% 75%
Employment growth 0.005 0.005 0.210 -0.075 0.094
Inventory-to-sales 0.190 0.157 0.244 0.103 0.231
Inventory investment rate 0.035 0.035 0.333 -0.104 0.180
Log sales 4.881 4.769 2.092 3.369 6.292
Sales growth 0.065 0.057 0.261 -0.049 0.167
Log cash-to-assets -2.533 -2.254 1.546 -3.524 -1.338
Log inventories 2.982 2.885 2.024 1.576 4.348
Log sales per worker 5.093 5.063 0.784 4.545 5.596
Cash-to-assets growth 0.025 0.116 0.868 -0.333 0.360
Log employment -0.213 -0.330 1.899 -1.635 1.082
Inventory-to-sales growth -0.018 -0.013 0.305 -0.148 0.120
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the relevant variables in estimation in the main
text. The sample is constructed from Compustat Fundamentals Annual files for 1980-2018. Sample
consists of 5,099 unique firms.
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I make use of Compustat Fundamentals Annual data from 1980-2018. Upon down-
loading this data, I keep only manufacturing firms (NAICS 31-33). In addition, I drop
firm years in which acquisitions exceed 5% of total assets (to avoid influence of large
mergers). To mitigate for any measurement error, I keep only those firms with non-
missing and positive book value of assets, number of employees, total inventories, and
sales. In addition, I keep only firms that exist in the data for at least two years. My
final sample consists of 5,099 unique firms. Table A1 reports summary statistics for
the variables used.
Adopters Dataset
The data for adopters was kindly provided to me by William Wempe from his joint
work with Michael Kinney. Xiaodan Gao also provided me with updated data. These
data include the years in which a Compustat manufacturer was identified to be a
JIT adopter (via Form 10-K filings, press releases, among other communications. See
Kinney and Wempe (2002) and Gao (2018) for further details). After verifying these
data, I conduct an search of my own and identify an additional 18 firms (reported
in Table A2). After linking these identified firm-years to those in my Compustat
dataset, I identify a total of 185 adopters in the manufacturing sector. Figure A1
plots the empirical CDF of the adopters in my sample over time.
Local Weather Events
I consider a number of weather events reported by NOAA from 1980-2018. These
events are reported at the county level. I keep only weather events that caused at
least $1 million in property damage in a given county and link these local disasters
to firm headquarter zip codes.
Using the links provided in Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016), I first map the county-
level weather events to firms’ headquarter zip codes in Compustat. Following this,
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Notes: The table reports the additional JIT adopters that were added to the original set of
adopters.
I link firms based on their customer-supplier relationships.1 In the end, I have a
dataset of Compustat firm i in industry j with supplier k in year t. I consider
weather disasters that hit supplier k’s headquarters. The idea is that customer firm
i, if it is an adopter, should see a sharper decline in sales growth when its supplier
k’s headquarters experiences an unexpected weather event. The regression I run is
1This is based on a regulation requiring firms to disclose customers representing more than 10%
of total reported sales (Financial Accounting Standard Board regulation No. 131).
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Notes: The figure plots the empirical cumulative density function for JIT adoption in the sample.
as follows












+ δi + δjt + vijt
The coefficient of interest is ϑ3 which describes the interaction between a JIT
adoption indicator and the total number of weather events hitting suppliers of a
given firm i. The results are reported in Table 1.4 in the main text.
Industry Results
The facts presented in Section 2 are robust to aggregation. Below, I provide evidence
that these patterns hold at the four-digit NAICS level.
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Table A3: Industry-Level Growth Regressions (Five-Year)
Change Inventory-to-sales Sales
Change in adopt share -0.081** 0.207***
(0.035) (0.069)
Fixed effects Industry, Year Industry, Year
Observations 2,159 2,159
Notes: The table reports panel regression results from Compustat Annual Fundamentals of manu-
facturing firms (NAICS 31-33). The dependent variables are five-year changes in logs of inventory-
to-sales and sales. The regressor of interest is the five-year change in share of adopters within a given
industry. All variables are standardized, industry and year fixed effects are specified, and standard
errors are clustered at the industry level. *** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance,
and * denotes 10% significance.
I begin by estimating
∆yjt = γ∆adoptsharejt + δj + δt + νjt (A.1)
where ∆yjt refers to the five-year difference in a given outcome for industry j in year
t. I consider the log the inventory-to-sales ratio and log sales as the outcomes of
interest. The regressor, ∆adoptsharejt, denotes the five-year difference in the share
of JIT firms residing in a given industry in year t. Table A3 reports the results. For
inventory-to-sales growth and sales growth, a one standard deviation increase in the
difference in the share of adopters is associated with a change of -8% and 21% of one
standard deviation in the outcomes, respectively.
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Notes: The figure displays a binned scatter plot of the normalized five-year difference in sales growth
variance against the normalized five-year difference in the share of adopters within an industry.
Furthermore, JIT adoption is associated with less variability in outcomes. Fig-
ure A2 plots the change in a measure of sales growth variance within an industry
against the change in the share of adopters within that industry. The slope of this
line is estimated from the following regression:
∆yjt = γ∆adoptsharejt + δj + δt + νjt (A.2)
The outcome variables specified are five-year differences in the variance of inventory-
to-sales growth, employment growth, and sales growth. Table A4 reports the results.
A one standard deviation increase in the share of JIT firms within an industry is
associated with a 5%-11% standard deviation reduction in variability of firm outcomes
within that industry.
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Table A4: Industry Level Variance Regressions (Five-Year)
Change Inventory-to-sales Employment Sales
Change in adopt share -0.053** -0.080*** -0.112***
(0.022) (0.028) (0.018)
Fixed effects Industry, Year Industry, Year Industry, Year
Observations 2,159 2,159 2,159
Notes: The table reports panel regression results from Compustat Annual Fundamentals of manu-
facturing firms (NAICS 31-33). The dependent variables are five-year changes in interquartile range
of (1) inventory-to-sales growth, (2) employment growth, and (3) sales growth. The regressor of
interest is the five-year change in share of adopters within a given industry over the same horizon.
All variables are standardized. Industry and year fixed effects are also specified. Standard errors
are clustered at the industry level. *** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance, and *
denotes 10% significance.
At the same time, industries with more adopters exhibit heightened cyclicality.
I show this by running a regression similar to (1.2) at the industry level. Table A5
reports the results. In an industry comprised of approximately 10% of JIT adopters,
an empirically relevant share, industry sales growth tends to rise by 0.7% above the
reported baseline.
Table A5: JIT Adoption and Cyclicality (Industry-Level)
Sales growth Sales growth
GDP growth 1.854***
(0.626)
Adopter share × GDP growth 6.928** 7.568*
(3.384) (3.851)
Fixed Effect Industry Industry, Year
Observations 3,044 3,044
Notes: The table reports regression results from Compustat Annual Fundamentals of manufacturing
firms (NAICS 31-33). The dependent variable is sales growth and the independent variable of interest
is the interaction between the share of JIT firms in an industry and GDP growth. Control variables
include logs of sales per worker, firm size, cash-to-assets, and inventory stock, as well as the share
of adopters. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. *** denotes 1% significance, **
denotes 5% significance, and * denotes 10% signficance.
Regarding sensitivity to weather events, I run a regression similar to (1.3), how-
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ever, I achieve broader coverage by instead looking at disasters originating at the
customer firm’s zip code. To this end, I do away with the customer-supplier links and
focus on industry-level evidence by running the following regression:















+ δj + δt + vjt
Rather than focusing on customer-supplier links, this regression provides evidence
that industries with a larger share of JIT adopters appear to be more exposed to
local weather disasters. Table A6 reports the results.




Total disasters within industry -0.0004*
(0.0002)
Adopt share × Total disasters within industry -0.007**
(0.003)
Fixed Effects Industry, Year
Observations 3,045
Notes: The table reports weather event regressions from a sample of Compustat manufacturing firms
(NAICS 31-33). The dependent variable is sales growth and the independent variable of interest
is the interaction between the share of JIT firms in an industry and total disasters within the
industry. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and industry levels respecitvely. *** denotes 1%
significance, ** denotes 5% significance, and * denotes 10% significance.
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A.1.2 Model
Order Threshold for Final Goods Firm
The firm’s problem delivers a threshold rule for placing an order. In particular, a
firm places an order if and only if the order cost draw is lower than a threshold order
cost: ξ < ξ∗(z, s, a) where
ξ̃(z, s, a) =
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An equilibrium is a set of functions,
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3. V A, V O, V ∗, V P solve the final good firm’s problem.
4. Market for final goods clears:
C =
∫ ∫
y(z, s∗, s′, a, ξ)dH(ξ∗)dµ(z, s, a)
+
∫ ∫
y(z, s, s′, a, ξ)[1− dH(ξ∗)]dµ(z, s, a)−K.
5. Market for orders clears:
O =
∫ ∫
[s∗(z, s, a, ξ)− s]dH(ξ∗)dµ(z, s, a).
6. Market for labor clears:
Nh =
∫ ∫
n(z, s∗, s′, ξ)dH(ξ∗)dµ(z, s, a)
+
∫ ∫














7. The evolution of the distribution of firms is consistent with individual decisions:
Γµ(z, s, a) =
∫ ∫ ∫
1Adµ(z, s, a)dH(ξ)dΦ(εz)
A(z′, s′, a′, ξ, εz;µ) = {(z, s, a)|s′(z, s, a, ξ;µ) = s′,
z′ = ρzz + σzεz, a
′(z, s, a, ξ;µ) = a′}
Φ(x) = P(εz ≤ x).
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Numerical Solution
The model is solved using methods that are standard in the heterogeneous firms
literature. The exogenous productivity process is discretized following Tauchen (1986)
which allows me to express the AR(1) process for log firm productivity as a Markov
process. I select Nz = 11 grid points for idiosyncratic productivity. Furthermore, I
select Ns = 200 grid points for the endogenous inventory holdings state. Finally, the
binary adoption state implies that the discretized model has 4,400 grid points.
I solve for the policy functions via value function iteration which is accelerated by
the use of the MacQueen-Porteus error bounds (MacQueen, 1966; Porteus, 1971).
This acceleration method makes use of the contraction mapping theorem to obtain
bounds for the true (infinite horizon) value function. These bounds are used in order
to produce a better update of the value function. The ergodic distribution of firms
is obtained via nonstochastic simulation as in Young (2010). This histogram-based
method overcomes sampling error issues associated with simulating individual firms
in order to obtain the stationary cross-sectional distribution.
Operationally, I solve the model by initiating a guess of the final goods price, p0. I
then compute q0 and w0 given the guess p0. From here, I solve the firm’s problem via
value function iteration and then obtain the ergodic distribution. From the policies
and ergodic distribution, I compute aggregates and the associated market clearing




Simulated Method of Moments
The parameter vector to be estimated is θ =
(
ρz σz ξNA ξA cs cf cm τ
)′
. Opera-
tionally, this requires solving my plant-level model, given θ, and simulating a panel
of firms from which I compute the different moments. I define a firm to be composed
of ten plants and simulate a panel of firms roughly eight times the size of the panel
in Compustat. A firm is defined to be an adopter if at least one of the ten plants
adopt JIT, consistent with the classification of JIT firms in my sample. I discard the
first 25 years of simulated data so as to minimize the impact of initial values. I then
collect the targeted empirical moments in a stacked vector m(X) which comes from
my Compustat sample. I next stack the model-based moments, which depend on θ,











where W is the optimal weighting matrix, defined to be the inverse of the covariance
matrix of the moments. I obtain the covariance matrix via a clustered bootstrap,
allowing for correlation within firms. I estimate the parameter vector via particle
swarm, a standard stochastic global optimization solver.2 3
The limiting distribution of the estimated parameter vector θ̂ is
√
N(θ̂ − θ) d→ N (0,Σ)
2I specify 100 particles.
3Considering all of the moments used in the overidentified SMM estimation, the J-test of overi-
dentifying restrictions rejects the null hypothesis.
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Figure A1: Monotonic Relationships
(a) Sales Volatility (b) Firm Profits
Notes: The figure plots the changes in select moments to changes in the parameters, in percentage
















and S is the ratio of the number of observations in the simulated data to the number
of observations in the sample.4 I obtain the standard errors by computing the secant
approximation to the partial derivative of the simulated moment vector with respect
to the parameter vector. Given the discontinuities induced by the discretized state
space, I select ε to be a step size of 1.0%.
Identification
The 11 moments jointly determine the eight parameters that reside in vector θ. To
supplement the discussion on monotone relationships from the main text, Figure A1
reports the monotone relationships between selected moments and parameters. Fig-
ure A2 reports the sensitivity of each of the seven parameters to changes in each of
the moments. These results come from an implementation of Andrews et al. (2017).
4I simulate 40,000 firms, thereby setting S to be approximately 7.8.
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Figure A2: Sensitivity
Notes: The figure plots sensitivity estimates as in Andrews et al. (2017). These estimates describe
the changes in each of the eight parameters to a one standard deviation increase in each moment.















I then transform this matrix so as that the interpretation of the coefficients is the effect
on each parameter of a one standard deviation change in the respective moments.
Estimating Subperiod Model
The counterfactual is estimated using data from 1980-1989. More specifically, I fix
all parameters to be as in the estimated full sample adoption model, and re-estimate
only the adoption costs, {cs, cf}. Table A1 reports the estimated parameters.
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Table A1: Estimated Parameters (1980-1989 Subperiod)
Description Parameter Estimate
Sunk cost of adoption cs 0.237
(0.024)
Continuation cost of adoption cf 0.123
(0.0004)
Notes: The table reports the estimated parameters for the 1980-1989 subperiod (standard errors
in parentheses). Parameters were estimated by targeting 11 moments. J-test of overidentifying
restrictions rejects null hypothesis. Firms in the model are defined to consist of ten plants.
The parameters are estimated precisely. The continuation cost of adoption is
higher at around 52% of the initial sunk cost relative to the estimated adoption model
in the main text. As a result, there is less adoption persistence in the counterfactual
model. The steady state of the counterfactual model has a mass of 0.09 adopters,
60% of the mass of adopters in the estimated model. Table A2 reports the model fit.
Table A3 reports the full parameterization for the counterfactual model.
Alternate Counterfactual: Re-estimated Order Costs
The incentives to adopt JIT in the model are governed by adoption costs as well as
order costs. As a robustness check to my counterfactual economy, I consider an al-
ternate counterfactual in which I also re-estimate the parameters governing the order
cost distributions, ξNA and ξA for the 1980s. I find that the estimated order and
adoption costs are little changed from the parameterization in the original counter-
factual. Table A4 details the estimated parameters and long-run aggregates of the
estimated full sample JIT economy vs. this alternate counterfactual. Comparing
these two models, I find that consumption-equivalent welfare rises 0.8% in the JIT
model relative to this counterfactual, slightly above the 0.6% increase relative to the
counterfactual detailed in the main text. Moreover, I find a comparable contraction
amid the disaster: this counterfactual economy contracts by 8.4% amid the same dis-
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Table A2: Model vs. Empirical Moments (1980-1989 Subperiod)
Moment Model Data
Mean(inventory-sales ratio|adopter) 0.176 0.150
(0.007)
Mean(inventory-sales ratio|non-adopter) 0.208 0.213
(0.003)
Std(inventory-sales ratio|adopter) 0.056 0.042
(0.0004)
Corr(inventory-sales ratio, log sales|adopter) -0.106 -0.309
(0.001)
Std(log sales|adopter) 0.218 0.169
(0.008)
Std(inventory-sales ratio|non-adopter) 0.066 0.070
(0.0002)
Corr(inventory-sales ratio, log sales|non-adopter) -0.287 -0.346
(0.0004)






Frequency of adoption 0.038 0.015
(0.002)
Notes: The table reports the model-based moments and the empirical moments for the estimated
1980-1989 model. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table A3: Counterfactual Parameterization
ρz σz ξNA ξA cs cf cm τ
0.878 0.044 0.483 0.047 0.237 0.123 0.182 0.938
Notes: The table reports the parameterization used to define the counterfactual model.
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aster as described in the main text. This amounts to a 1.1 percentage point sharper
contraction in the JIT economy, consistent with the headline results.
Table A4: Alternate Counterfactual Estimation
Description Parameter Estimate
Order cost distribution (non-adopters) ξNA 0.479
(0.046)
Order cost distribution (adopters) ξA 0.042
(0.001)
Sunk cost of adoption cs 0.229
(0.043)
Continuation cost of adoption cf 0.130
(0.008)
Notes: The table reports the estimated parameters for the alternate counterfactual detailed above
(standard errors in parentheses). Parameters were estimated by targeting 11 moments. J-test of




In this section I provide different robustness checks related to the JIT tradeoff pre-
sented in the main text. I begin by examining the sensitivity of the tradeoff to different
parameter values. I then consider alternate disaster persistence specifications.
Alternate Parameterizations
Table A1: Robustness Parameterization
Description Parameter Value Value
Idiosyncratic productivity persistence ρz 0.900 0.450
Idiosyncratic productivity volatility σz 0.250 0.025
Order cost upper bound (non-adopters) ξNA 0.600 0.200
Order cost upper bound (adopters) ξA 0.100 0.025
Carrying cost cm 0.200 0.100
Notes: The table reports the alternate parameterizations chosen to compute the excess GDP con-
traction in the JIT economy relative to the counterfactual economy.
Table A1 reports a number of different parameter specifications. I vary all param-
eters in different directions with the exception of the adoption costs which trace out
the frontier displayed in Figures 1·8. Figure A1 plots the gap in GDP growth amid a
disaster between the estimated and counterfactual economies. The solid line depicts
the figure in the main text while the shaded area captures the different tradeoffs re-
flected in the alternate parameterizations. Across all specifications, there is a robust
negative gap indicating a sharper contraction in the estimated economy relative to
the counterfactual.
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Figure A1: Robustness Checks to Disaster
Notes: The figure plots the exceess GDP contraction in the estimated model relative to the counter-
factual. The thick solid line refers to the estimated model parameterization used in the main text.
The shaded area is obtained by considering the maximal and minimal gap across the two models in
each period across the parameterizations detailed in Table A1.
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Disaster Size
Table A2: GDP Contractions by Disaster Severity







Notes: The table reports GDP contractions by disaster size. Column (1) reports the size of the
unanticipated shock relative to the baseline shock size reported in the main text (baseline= 1.00).
The second column reports the excess GDP contraction in the estimated vs. the counterfactual (in
percentage points).
Table A2 reports the excess output contraction in the estimated economy relative
to the counterfactual for lesser disasters to the one calibrated in the main text. Across
all magnitudes, the JIT economy experiences a deeper output contraction relative to
the counterfactual as indicated by the negative numbers in column 2. The deadline
result is reported in the final row.
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Alternate Disaster Persistence
Figure A2: One-Year Disaster
Notes: The figure plots the evolution of GDP amid a one year unanticipated disaster episode. The
estimated JIT economy contracts 0.6 percentage points further than the counterfactual economy
with less JIT.
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Figure A3: Five-Year Disaster
Notes: The figure plots the evolution of GDP amid a five year unanticipated disaster episode. The
estimated JIT economy contracts 1.5 percentage points further than the counterfactual economy
with less JIT.
Figure A4: Seven-Year Disaster
Notes: The figure plots the evolution of GDP amid a seven year unanticipated disaster episode. The




In this sub-section, I allow for there to be uncertainty as to whether the disaster
occurs in period t. This uncertainty is fully resolved following t regardless of whether
or not the disaster comes to pass.
Let λ denote the probability that the large aggregate shock to A is realized at
time t. Recall that firms face the following problem in the production stage:
V P (z, s̃, a) = max
s′∈[0,s̃]
π(z, s̃, s′, a) + βE
[
V A(z′, s′, a′)
]
In period t − 1, however, the expectation is not only taken across idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity realizations but across the realization of the disaster as well:
V A(z′, s′, a′) = λV ADisaster(z
′, s′, a′) + (1− λ)V ASS(z′, s′, a′)
I evaluate the dynamics amid the disaster shock by numerically implementing
an algorithm similar to the unanticipated case. Assuming the disaster lasts from
t = 2, . . . , T , I first guess a price p0 and work backwards from T to obtain a sequence
of time-indexed value and policy functions. With these in hand, I proceed to a forward
step in which I push the distribution of firms forward across time utilizing the optimal
policies from the backward step. From here, I compute aggregates, check for market
clearing, and update the price until convergence.
Figure A5 plots two relevant quantities. On the left axis, I plot the percent
increase in economy-wide inventory stocks accumulated by firms in anticipation of the
disaster. Intuitively, with the prospect of a widespread disaster on the horizon, firms
will optimally hold an added precautionary stock of inventories. For each probability,
λ, considered I plot the percent increase in inventory holdings prior to the shock
relative to the estimated baseline steady state economy. On the right axis, I plot the
excess drop in output in the JIT economy relative to the counterfactual economy.
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Figure A5: JIT Tradeoff Robust to Anticipation
Notes: The dots, which correspond to the left axis, display the excess output contraction (relative
to the less-JIT counterfactual) for different disaster probabilties. On the right axis, the bar plot
reports the percent increase in inventory holdings due to the precautionary motive that arises with
anticipation of the disaster.
Importantly, despite the added precautionary inventory holdings among firms, there
is still a sizable excess drop in output across the two economies, indicating that the
JIT tradeoff documented in the main text is robust to the anticipation modeled here.
A.2 Appendix for Chapter 2
A.2.1 Empirics
SPF: Variable Descriptions
While the paper focuses on inflation forecasts based on the GDP deflator, in this
subsection I report additional results that make use of several other variables. Before
presenting these results, I provide the variable descriptions below:
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• NGDP–Quarterly nominal GDP growth forecast (seasonally adjusted, annual
rate). Prior to 1992, these are forecasts for nominal GNP.
• RGDP–Quarterly real GDP growth forecast (seasonally adjusted, annual rate).
• PGDP–Quarterly GDP price index growth forecast (seasonally adjusted, annual
rate). From 1992 - 1995, GDP implicit deflator is used, and prior to 1992, GNP
implicit deflator.
• UNEMP–Forecasts for the quarterly average unemployment rate (seasonally
adjusted, average of underlying monthly levels).
• EMP–Quarterly average growth of nonfarm payroll employment (seasonally ad-
justed, average of underlying monthly levels).
• RNRESIN–Quarterly growth forecast of real nonresidential fixed investment.
Also known as business fixed investment (seasonally adjusted, annual rate).
• RRESINV–Quarterly growth forecast of real residential fixed investment (sea-
sonally adjusted, annual rate).
• TBILL–Quarterly forecast of average three-month Treasury bill rate (percentage
points, average of underlying daily levels).
• HOUSING– Quarterly growth forecast of average housing starts (seasonally
adjusted, annual rate, average of underlying monthly levels).
• CPI–Quarterly forecasts of the headline CPI inflation rate (percentage points,
seasonally adjusted, annual rate). Quarterly forecasts are annualized q/q per-
cent changes of quarterly average price index level (average of underlying monthly
levels).
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• RCONSUM – Quarterly growth forecast of real personal consumption expendi-
tures (seasonally adjusted, annual rate).
• RFEDGOV –Quarterly growth forecast of real federal government consumption
and gross investment (seasonally adjusted, annual rate).
• INDPROD – Quarterly forecasters of level of the index of industrial production,
seasonally adjusted (quarterly forecasts are for quarterly average of underlying
monthly levels).
• TBOND–Quarterly average 10-year Treasury bond rate (percentage points, av-
erage of the underlying daily levels). the underlying daily levels
• RSLGOV–Quarterly growth forecast of real state and local government con-
sumption and gross investment (seasonally adjusted, annual rate).
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Modified Error Predictability Regressions (Robustness)
This subsection reports the robustness results for the modified regressions in Section
5 of the main text. Table B1 reports the results by defining 7-year year windows for
the rolling standard deviations. Table B2 reports the results from a 10-year rolling
window specification.






Revision × Quarterly -0.194**
(0.090)
Revision × Fundamental Volatility 0.093**
(0.040)
Observations 58,739 58,739
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients of forecast error predictability across two specifica-
tions. The variable Quarterly is equal to 0 if the SPF variable is released at a non-quarterly frequency
and 1 otherwise. The Fundamental Volatility variable is a time-varying index of fundamental volatil-
ity constructed as described in the text. Column (1) reports a simple regression of errors-on-revisions
while columns (2) includes the two proxies described. In addition to the variables reported in the
table, column (2) includes the proxies individually as well as all of their interactions . Standard
errors for forecaster-level regressions are as in Driscoll and Kraay (1998). Data used for estimation
come from SPF (1964Q4-2018Q3). *** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance, and *
denotes 10% significance.
124






Revision × Quarterly -0.209**
(0.091)
Revision × Fundamental Volatility 0.118**
(0.036)
Observations 48,827 48,827
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients of forecast error predictability across two specifica-
tions. The variable Quarterly is equal to 0 if the SPF variable is released at a non-quarterly frequency
and 1 otherwise. The Fundamental Volatility variable is a time-varying index of fundamental volatil-
ity constructed as described in the text. Column (1) reports a simple regression of errors-on-revisions
while columns (2) includes the two proxies described. In addition to the variables reported in the
table, column (2) includes the proxies individually as well as all of their interactions . Standard
errors for forecaster-level regressions are as in Driscoll and Kraay (1998). Data used for estimation




General Linear Noisy Information RE Model
Theories of linear rational expectations are unable to account for over- and underre-
actions. Full information rational expectations counterfactually imply that errors are
unpredictable. In addition, models of sticky information imply that forecast errors
and forecast revisions are unrelated at the forecaster level.5 In this sub-section, I
focus on a general linear rational expectations model and provide analytical results
about error predictability.
Consider a linear Gaussian state space model. Suppose there are n latent state
variables and m exogenous signals.
st = Ast−1 + Bwt (A.5)
zit = Cst + Dv
i
t
Note that st is an n×1 vector, A is n×n, B is n×n and wt is n×1. Furthermore, zt is
m×1, C is m×n, D is m×m and vit is m×1. There are no other restrictions placed
on the model. In particular, st can be a vector of many different state variables,
or lags of itself. B need not be a diagonal matrix. Furthermore, zit can include an
arbitrary finite number of observed signals. The noise vector vit can include private





t − zit|t−1) (A.6)
where κ is the (constant) Kalman gain. Since the state is unobservable, forecasters
can only formulate predictions of the signals and assess the mistakes made with regard
5If a forecaster updates, he does so with full information rational expectations so that the subse-
quent error is unrelated to the revision. On the other hand, if the forecaster does not update, then
there is no revision.
6I index this vector by i in general to allow for forecaster-specific signals.
126





t − zit|t−1) (A.7)
Forecast errors for the generalized linear model can be expressed as follows
zit+1 − zit+1|t = (zit+1 − zit+1|t−1)−CAκ(zit − zit|t−1) (A.8)
Furthermore, the forecast revision is
zit+1|t − zit+1|t−1 = CAκ(zit − zit|t−1) (A.9)
Using these expressions, one can derive the two testable implications presented in the
main text.
Proposition 5. The generalized linear model implies the following:
(i) β1 = 0
(ii) α1 = CA(I−Cκ)(κC)−1(CA)−1 > 0
Proof. We have the following expressions for forecast errors and revisions, respec-
tively:
FEi = CA(I− κC)(st − sit|t−1) + CBwt+1 + Dvit+1 −CAκDvit
FRi = CAκDvit + CAκC(st − sit|t−1)
Then,
(a) β1 ∝ Cov(FEi, FRi) = CA(I− κC)Ψ(CAKC)′ −CAK(DvitvitD)(CAκ)′
where Ψ denotes the state estimation error variance. This becomes
β1 ∝ CA(I − κC)Ψ(CAκC)′ − CAK(DvitvitD)(CAκ)′
= CA
{





because the term in brackets is zero by the definition of the Kalman gain.
(b) Denoting FE and FR as the cross-sectional mean of the forecast error and
revision, respectively, we have
α1 ∝ Cov(FE,FR) = CA(I − κC)Ψ(CAκC)′
The variance of the average revision is Var(FR) = CAκCΨ(CAκC)′ Thus, we
have
α1 = CA(I − κC)(CAκC)−1
The proofs are straightforward: (a) holds given the orthogonality condition that
must be satisfied at the individual-level under rational expectations. Forecast error




= 0 for any µ residing in the forecaster’s
information set.7 Put another way, rationality implies the optimal use of informa-
tion so that no variable residing in one’s information set may predict the forecast
error. This very general model precludes the predictability of forecast errors at the
individual-level. As a result, any such linear Gaussian model with mean square loss
cannot generate error predictability, regardless of the signal structure.
Moreover, (b) is a generalization of the CG result. The extent to which the mean
revision predicts mean errors is determined by the Kalman gain matrix and the matrix
C which maps the underlying state to the observed signal vector. The generalized
linear model nests the CG result. Letting C = 1, D = σv, A = ρ and B = σw, it
follows that α1 =
1−κ
κ
. In this limiting case, one can recover an estimate of information
rigidity by projecting consensus errors on consensus revisions. Importantly, the signal
structure must be such that C = 1. If, instead, the elements of C include additional
parameters, or there is common noise in the signal vector, then it is no longer possible





t) = 0. See Pesaran and Weale (2006).
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to cleanly extract an the Kalman gain from a standard OLS regression.8
As a result, a highly generalized linear rational expectations model is unable to
explain the patterns in the data.
Error Predictability Under Time-Varying Volatility
From the general nonlinear model described in the main text, the covariance of errors











st[p̂(st|Z it)− p̂(st|Z it−1)]dst
)
When there are no approximation errors, error orthogonality holds and β1 = 0.
In the case of non-zero approximation errors, however, the first term is the source
of observed underreaction while the second term governs the extent of overreaction.
When forecast revisions are more closely related to the underlying state, then under-
reactions arise as the first term dominates the second. If instead, forecast revisions
covary more with the current prediction than the underlying state, then overreac-
tions result. In essence, when the approximate revision incorporates more noise than
is optimally called for, then forecasters will overreact.
Similar to the approximate prediction defined above, the consensus forecast arising





















8See CG for a discussion of the bias in estimated information rigidities induced by public noise.
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More volatile revisions increase the scope for overreaction. Upon aggregating
(symmetrically) across several individual forecasts, the consensus revision will exhibit
more persistence than the individual revisions. This motivates the following result
Proposition 6. In the nonlinear noisy information model, α1 ≥ β1.
Proof. Recall that




t+h|t − ẑit+h|t−1)′(ẑit+h|t − ẑit+h|t−1)]−1(ẑit+h|t − ẑit+h|t−1)′(zt+h − ẑit+h|t)
To prove the proposition, I will show that the covariance between consensus errors
and revisions is weakly greater than that for pooled errors and revisions. I will then
show that the variance of the consensus revision is weakly smaller than the variance
of the pooled variance.
We can express the covariance between errors and revisions as
C(zt+h − ẑit+h|t, ẑit+h|t − ẑit+h|t−1) =
∫ ∫







and at the consensus level






















We wish to show that the second equation is weakly greater than the first. One can
note immediately that the second and third terms of both equations are equal (given
the linearity of the expectations operator), and so they cancel out. The resulting










(zt+h − ẑit+h|t)(ẑit+h|t − ẑit+h|t−1)didt
By distributing the revision into the error on either side of the inequality, we can











on the RHS. Again, due to the linearity of the expectations operator, these terms








































































which is true since the terms in hard brackets on the RHS is the cross-sectional
variance of the forecast whereas the term in hard brackets on the LHS is a cross-
sectional covariance. Hence, the covariance of the consensus errors with consensus
revisions is weakly greater than the covariance of individual-level pooled errors and
revisions.
Finally, I show that the variance of the consensus revision is weakly smaller than
the variance of the pooled revision. This is simpler to verify. Note that



















Once again, the second term in each of the above revision variance equations will






which holds by Jensen’s inequality.
The model implies that the OLS coefficient estimated from an errors on revi-
sions regression will be weakly greater than the analogous coefficient obtained from a
pooled regression of individual forecasters. This result does depend on the presence
of nonlinear dynamics. In fact, this holds in the linear setting as well (see Appendix
B).9
9This need not be the case in other economic settings in which agents take actions, and their
decisions are aggregated in a manner other than by taking a simple mean. Depending on the context,
it is possible for the aggregate decision to also exhibit overreaction or excess volatility. Bordalo et
al. (2020) provide a discussion of this.
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A.2.3 Calibration
I internally calibrate four parameters: {σv,1, σv,2, cPF,1, cPF,2} where the subscript one
denotes the first variable (real GDP) and two denotes the second variable (unemploy-
ment). These parameters are calibrated to match four moments: {β1,1, β1,2, α1,1, α1,2}.
Based on the calibration, the two state variables must only be simulated once.
Following this, I simulate a panel of forecasters who select KF or PF depending on the
mean square errors and their model adoption cost draw. Following the endogenous
model selection decision, I simulate a panel of errors and revisions from which I
then compute model-implied errors-on-revisions coefficients. The simulated panel of
forecasters is roughly 7 times the size of the size of the panel of SPF forecasters.10.
I then collect the targeted empirical moments in a stacked vector m(X) which
comes from the SPF sample. I next stack the model-based moments, which depend
on θ = (β1,1 α1,1 β1,2 α1,2)
′, in the vector m(θ). Finally I search the parameter space










where the weighting matrix is set to be the identity matrix, W = I.
10I also discard the first 1,000 observations of the simulated state variables
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A.2.4 Details on Particle Filtering
In this section I briefly summarize the particle filter which is a popular nonlinear
filter that have been devised to handle state dynamics such as unobserved stochastic
volatility.
In their seminal paper, Gordon, Salmond, and Smith (n.d.) propose the bootstrap
filter which is a popular variant to the particle filter. In principle, this approach
makes use to mass points (particles) to approximate the underlying filtering density,
p(st|Zit). This is done by defining the set of particles and associated weights: χ =
{s(n), ω(n)}Nn=1.
Importantly, the filter still follows a general predict-update algorithm. For each






























so that they sum to one. Lastly, the nowcast of the state is computed as a weighted









One common issue with sequential importance sampling is that the sample of particles
tends to degenerate as few particles are given most of the weight. As a result, I make
11The precise manner in which the weights are updated depends on choices for the importance
distribution.
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use of the common sequential importance resampling scheme in which I resample the
particles, each with a probability equal to its weight.
Forecast errors and revisions are analogous to the formulation with the Kalman
filter generalizations. The only difference is that the particle filtered estimates are
not formulated by making use of the Kalman filtering equations. Nonetheless, these
estimates approximate the optimal forecast.
A.3 Appendix for Chapter 3
A.3.1 Derivations
Proof of Proposition 1




t− x̂it|t−1). So the forecast error is xt− x̂it|t = (1− κ̂)(xt−
x̂it|t−1)− κ̂vit, and the revision is x̂it|t − x̂it|t−1 = κ̂[(xt − x̂it|t−1) + vit]. Then, evaluating
the population coefficient:
βOC1 =
C(xt − x̂it|t, x̂it|t − x̂it|t−1)
V(x̂it|t − x̂it|t−1)
=
(1− κ̂)κ̂V(xt − x̂it|t−1)− κ̂2σ2v
κ̂2[V(xt − x̂it|t−1) + σ2v ]
=
(1− κ̂)V(xt − xit|t−1)− κ̂σ2v
κ̂[V(xt − x̂it|t−1) + σ2v ]
Noting that the biased Kalman gain is, κ̂ =
V(xt−x̂it|t−1)
V(xt−x̂it|t−1)+σ̂2v
, we can use this definition









κ̂[V(xt − x̂it|t−1) + σ2v ]
=
(σ̂2v − σ2v)κ̂
κ̂[V(xt − x̂it|t−1) + σ2v ]
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Finally, since σ̂v = ασv, and α ∈ (0, 1), we have:
βOC1 =
(α2 − 1)σ2v
V(xt − x̂it|t−1) + σ2v
< 0.
Deriving Errors and Revisions for SI Model


























st = Ast−1 + Bwt
yit = Cst + v
i
t
Invoking the Kalman filter





xit|t = (1− κ1)ρxit−1|t−1 + κ1yit





F it|t−1 = λρx
i
t−1|t−1 + (1− λ)ρF it−1|t−1
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where λ = κ1+Rκ2
1+R
and κ1, κ2 are the Kalman gains belonging to the two-dimensional




























(λ− κ2)ρxit−1|t−1 + (1− λ)ρF it−1|t−1 + κ2yit
]
=
1− κ1 +R(λ− κ2)
1 +R

















































Ft = x̃t|t = (1− λ)ρFt−1 + λxt
x̃t|t−1 = λρxt−1|t−1 + (1− λ)ρFt−1
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From here, it follows that
xt − x̃it|t = xt −
1− κ1 + (λ− κ2)R
1 +R




= (1− λ)xt −
1− κ1 + (λ− κ2)R
1 +R






















and the forecast revision is
x̃it|t − x̃it|t−1 =
(1− κ1) + (λ− κ2)R− (1 +Rλ)
1 +R
xit|t−1 + λxt + λv
i
t
= −κ1 − κ2R
1 +R
xit|t−1 + λxt + λv
i
t
= λ(xt − xit|t−1 + vit)
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Proof of Proposition 2
βSI1 =
Cov(xt − x̃it|t, x̃it|t − x̃it|t−1)
Var(x̃it|t − x̃it|t−1)
=
(1− λ)λCov(xt, xt − xit|t−1)− λ2σ2v
λ2
[








































κ1 − (1− κ1)
=
1− κ1 +R(1− κ2)
κ1 +Rκ2




Proof of Proposition 3
Each model delivers a coefficient of error predictability that is a function of parameters
θ, R, or α.
βDE1 =
−θ(1 + θ)






V(xt − x̂it|t−1) + σ2v
.
To show how the three models can match the identical error predictability coefficient,
β1, I consider the three pairs of models and draw the implications out in either
direction to establish equality.
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DE → SI




R(κ1 − κ2) = βDE1 (κ1 +Rκ2)
R(κ1 − κ2) = βDE1 κ1 + βDE1 Rκ2
R(κ1 − κ2)− βDE1 Rκ2 = βDE1 κ1
R =
βDE1 κ1
κ1 − (1 + βDE1 )κ2
which, from the definition of βDE1 , is equal to
R =
[κ1(1 + θ)− κ2](1 + θ) + (κ1 − κ2)ρ2θ2
(1 + θ)2 + ρ2θ2
.
SI→DE
Given {ρ, σw, σv, R} we solve for θ by setting βDE1 = βSI1
−θ(1 + θ)
(1 + θ)2 + ρ2θ2
= βSI1
−θ(1 + θ) = βSI1 (1 + θ)2 + βSI1 ρ2θ2
−θ − θ2 = βSI1 (1 + 2θ + θ2) + βSI1 ρ2θ2
0 = βSI1 + 2β
SI
1 θ + θ + β
SI
1 θ
2 + θ2 + βSI1 ρ
2θ2
0 = βSI1 + (2β
SI
1 + 1)θ + [1 + (1 + ρ
2)βSI1 ]θ
2.
From the definition of βSI1 , we can express the above quadratic as:[















Given {ρ, σw, σv, θ}, we solve for α by setting βDE1 = βOC1
(α2 − 1)σ2v










V(xt − x̂it|t−1) = βDE1 + 1.
from the definition of βDE1 , the above equality can be expressed as:
α =
√
(1 + θ)[σ2v − θV(xt − x̂it|t−1)]
[(1 + θ)2 + ρ2θ2]σ2v
Note that due to the recursive nature of the overconfidence model, V(xt − x̂it|t−1) ≡
Ψ̂it|t−1(α) is itself a function of α. As a result, there is no closed form expression that
characterizes the mapping from θ to α.
OC→DE
Similar to the result relating SI→DE, we begin with:
0 = βOC1 + (2β
OC
1 + 1)θ + [1 + (1 + ρ
2)βOC1 ]θ
2.
from the definition of βOC1 , we obtain
0 =
(α2 − 1)σ2v
V(xt − x̂it|t−1) + σ2v
+
(V(xt − x̂it|t−1) + (2α2 − 1)σ2v




(V(xt − x̂it|t−1) + [α2 + ρ2(α2 − 1)]σ2v














(1 +R)κ1σ2v +R(κ1 − κ2)V(xt − x̂it|t−1)
(κ1 +Rκ2)σ2v
.
Again, there is no closed form expression that maps α to R since the state estimation
error, V(xt − x̂it|t−1) ≡ Ψ̂(α), is a nonlinear function of α.
OC→SI
Finally, given α in the overconfidence model, we can equate βOC1 to β
SI




(κ1 − κ2)[V(xt − x̂it|t−1) + σ2v ]− (α2 − 1)σ2vκ2
.
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Proof of Proposition 4










(i) For the overconfidence model, the constant Kalman gain is:
κ̂ =
V(xt − x̂it|t−1
V(xt − x̂it|t−1 + σ2v
∈ [0, 1].








ρκ̂(xt−1 − x̂it−1|t−2) + ρκ̂vit−1
)
=
C[κ̂(xt − x̂it|t−1), ρκ̂(xt−1 − x̂it−1|t−2) + ρκ̂vit−1]
ρ2κ̂2[V(xt−1 − x̂it−1|t−2) + σ2v ]
=
ρ2κ̂2(1− κ̂)V(xt−1 − x̂it−1|t−2)− κ̂3ρ2σ2v
ρ2κ̂2[V(xt−1 − x̂it−1|t−2) + σ2v ]
=
(1− κ̂)V(xt−1 − x̂it−1|t−2)− κ̂σ2v
V(xt−1 − x̂it−1|t−2) + σ2v
=
σ̂2v κ̂− σ2v κ̂
V(xt−1 − x̂it−1|t−2) + σ2v
=
(α2 − 1)σ2κ̂
V(xt−1 − x̂it−1|t−2) + σ2v
= κ̂βOC1 ≤ βOC1 .
(ii) In the diagnostic expectations model, the current-period prediction is:
xi,θt|t = E(xt|It) + θ
[
E(xt|I it − E(xt|I it−1)
]
,
where E(xt|I it) ≡ xit|t and E(xt|I it−1) ≡ xit|t−1. The forecast revision is therefore:
xi,θt|t − x
i,θ
t|t−1 = (1 + θ)(x
i
t|t − xit|t−1)− θρ(xit−1|t−1 − xit−1|t−2)
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t−1|t−2) = −(1 + θ)θρ
2V(xit−1|t−1 − xit−1|t−2)




2(1 + θ)2V(xit−1|t−1−xit−1|t−2) + θ2ρ4V(xit−2|t−2−xit−2|t−3)
Noting that the error variance is time invariant, and evaluating the covariance
divided by the variance, we obtain:
γ1 =
−θ(1 + θ)
(1 + θ)2 + θ2ρ2
= βDE1
(iii) It suffices to show that Cov(x̃it|t− x̃it|t−1, x̃it|t−1− x̃it|t−2) = 0. The current period
revision is:




= λ(yit − xit|t−1)
145
and the previous period revision can be expressed as:
x̃it|t−1 − x̃it|t−2 =
1
1 +R
(xit|t−1 − xit|t−2) +
R
1 +R


































λρκ1(xt−1 − xit−1|t−2 + vit−1)




ρκ1 +Rλρκ1 +R(1− λ)ρκ2
1 +R
]
(xt−1 − xit−1|t−2 + vit−1)
=
ρ(κ1 +Rκ2) + ρRλ(κ1 − κ2)
1 +R







(xt−1 − xit−1|t−2 + vit−1)
Then,
Cov(x̃it|t − x̃it|t−1, x̃it|t−1 − x̃it|t−2) = 0
By definition, κ1 =
Ψ
Ψ+σ2v
where Ψ is the steady state forecast error variance (i.e.
the variance that solves the Ricatti equation: Ψ = (1 − κ1)ρ2Ψ + σ2w). From
this it follows that the last term in hard brackets is zero.
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A.3.2 Empirics




















EMP IP NGDP PGDP RCON RFED RGDP RNIN RRIN RSL
Variable
Beta Gamma
Notes: Figure displays 95% confidence intervals for estimated coefficients of error predictability and
revision persistence, (β1 and γ1 in the main text, respectively). Double clustered standard errors are
specified. EMP- Employment, IP - Industrial Production, NGDP - Nominal GDP, PGDP - GDP
Deflator, RCON - Real Consumption, RFED - Real Federal Government Spending, RGDP - Real
GDP, RNIN - Real Nonresidential Investment, RRIN - Real Residential Investment, and RSL - Real
State and Local Government Spending.
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CPI IP NGDP PGDP RCON RFED RGDP RNIN RRIN RSL TBOND
Variable
Beta Gamma
Notes: Figure displays 95% confidence intervals for estimated coefficients of error predictability and
revision persistence, (β1 and γ1 in the main text, respectively). Double clustered standard errors are
specified. CPI - Consumer Price Index, IP - Industrial Production, NGDP - Nominal GDP, PGDP
- GDP Deflator, RCON - Real Consumption, RFED - Real Federal Government Spending, RGDP
- Real GDP, RNIN - Real Nonresidential Investment, RRIN - Real Residential Investment, RSL -
Real State and Local Government Spending, and TBOND - 10 Year Government Bond.
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CPI IP NGDP PGDP RCON RFED RGDP RNIN RRIN RSL TBOND
Variable
Beta Gamma
Notes: Figure displays 95% confidence intervals for estimated coefficients of error predictability and
revision persistence, (β1 and γ1 in the main text, respectively). Double clustered standard errors are
specified. CPI - Consumer Price Index, IP - Industrial Production, NGDP - Nominal GDP, PGDP
- GDP Deflator, RCON - Real Consumption, RFED - Real Federal Government Spending, RGDP
- Real GDP, RNIN - Real Nonresidential Investment, RRIN - Real Residential Investment, RSL -




In a model with heterogeneous priors (Patton & Timmermann, 2010), forecasters
wish to minimize their mean squared forecast errors while tracking their long-run





(xt − x̃it|t)2 + ω(x̃it|t − µi)2
)












Furthermore, this model implies that revisions are unpredictable:




E(xt|I it)− E(xt|I it−1)
]
Measurement Error
In a model of measurement error, or trembling-hand noise as in Branch (2004), implies
that the reported forecast is x̃it|t = E(xt|I it) + ξit. The measurement error, ξit is
distributed ξit
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2ξ ). While such models can deliver a negative coefficient of
error predictability, the forecast revision is simply x̃it|t− x̃it|t−1 = ξit − ξit−1, and hence,
unpredictable.
Smoothing Motives
First, I discuss a standard model of smoothing motives. If forecasters wish to strate-
gically temper their revisions, as in the smoothing motive models of Coibion and
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Gorodnichenko (2015) and Kucinskas and Peters (2019), then the optimal forecast is
x̃it|t = (1− φ)E(xt|I it) + φx̃it|t−1
where φ = α(1−δ)
1+α(1−δ) . The parameter α governs the smoothing motive. As α → ∞,
the smoothing motive (or quadratic revision cost) increases, and forecasters are less
willing to update their forecasts. On the other hand, if α = 0, then the smoothing
motive disappears. Furthermore, δ is the discount factor. From this model, the
autocorrelation of revisions is simply φ > 0. In other words, revisions are positively
autocorrelated.
I next, introduce a model with multi-horizon forecasting and smoothing with
respect to the long term forecast. This model is rational, however, it is capable
of generating negatively serially correlated revisions. Suppose that in each period, t,
forecasters generate predictions for horizons {t+h}Hh=0 with H > 0. At the same time,
there is a long-run forecast, or prior, that forecasters wish to track for reputational

















Kohlhas and Walther (2020) present an elegant theory of asymmetric attention which
is able to generate overreaction to current output realizations. This theory, however,
is unable to replicate overreaction on the basis of forecast revisions. Furthermore, I
demonstrate here that it is also unable to generate serially correlated revisions.12
I consider a stylized version of the baseline asymmetric attention model in Kohlhas
and Walther (2020). In particular, suppose the target forecast variable is a function
12The extended version of this model that incorporates irrational overconfidence, however, would
be able to deliver these facts.
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of two structural components:
yt = x1t + x2t,
where
x1t = a1θt + b1u1t
x2t = a2θt + b2u2t
θt = ρθt−1 + ηt,
where ujt ∼ N (0, 1) and ηt ∼ N (0, σ2η). Forecasters do not observe the structural
components or the latent state, θ. Instead, they observe two private signals each
period,
yi1t = x1t + q1ε
i
jt




i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1). The precision of signals is component-specific so that weight
placed on new information (i.e. attention) is asymmetric across components. This







As a result, the conditional expectation for a given component is:
E(xjt|I it) = mjzijt + (1−mj)E(xjt|I it−1),
and the conditional expectation of the latent state is:
E(θt|I it) = E(θt|I it−1) + g1[zi1t − E(zi1t|I it−1)] + g2[zi2t − E(zi2t|I it−1)],
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where gj refers to the component-specific Kalman gain (a function of mj).
From the above set up, one can define the forecast revision for yt+1 to be equal to
the sum of the revisions made to the unobserved components x1t+1 and x2t+1:
yit+1|t − yit+1|t−1 = (xi1,t+1|t − xi1,t+1|t−1) + (xi2,t+1|t − xi2,t+1|t−1).
The righthand side of this equation, however, is simply equal to the sum of the
innovation errors scaled by the attention coefficients,
yit+1|t − yit+1|t−1 = m1[zi1,t − E(x1,t|I it−1)] +m2[zi2,t − E(x2,t|I it−1)],
which are themselves serially uncorrelated as a result of Bayesian updating. Hence,
this theory is unable to accommodate autocorrelated revisions.
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